SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
IN THE EU EASTERN NEIGHBORHOOD:
CHALLENGES AND REALITIES

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Security Architecture in the EU Eastern Neighborhood: Challenges and Realities

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The international initiative “Security Architecture in the EU Eastern Neighborhood: Challenges and Realities” was developed in Chisinau on 20-24 of June 2010, being organized by the Pro Marshall Center of the Republic of Moldova with the financial support of the East East: Partnership Beyond Borders Program (EE:PBBP) of the Soros Foundation-Moldova and co-financed by the Embassy of Lithuania in Chisinau, as NATO Contact Point. This project envisaged participation of the experts from Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Romania, Switzerland and Ukraine in the Roundtable Discussions held in Chisinau, being preceded by several meetings with the Moldovan decision- and policy-makers and relevant think tanks/NGO representatives. The main goal of the discussions was raising the public awareness and facilitating public debate on issues concerning the security system reform in Moldova and building a common approach among decision-makers and civil society on security future of Moldova, based on the experience available in the new EU member states, and learning from the knowledge acquired by the European countries concerning various security patterns. Thus, the following objectives have been addressed during this initiative:

- raising key issues of security system and its architecture in the EU Eastern Neighborhood, its challenges and realities, debated through a public discussion with national and international actors, represented by decision-makers and civil society;
- facilitating access to experience gained in Central and Eastern Europe in reforming the security system, its risks and opportunities;
- bringing together representatives of the civil society, mass-media and public institutions to raise public awareness on issues concerning Moldova's societal security and security of its citizens through a regional prospect;
- establishing collaboration with relevant international experts in the field of security studies and integration to identify series of issues covering the main existing problems in the security of Moldova and the region;
- familiarizing the civil society with the security issues and foreign policy trends within Europe as well as sharing opinions and positive examples of building national security that could contribute to ensuring a certain regional stability, etc.

At the same time, this initiative addressed an important issue concerning the opportunities for speeding the European integration processes within the Republic of Moldova. This should be addressed by the whole society through its on-going collaboration with the EU member countries that in a longer prospect could include on the political agenda the Euro-Atlantic integration issue as well. At present, this
discussion is not considered relevant to be raised neither by the government nor by the civil society from Moldova. While the idea of EU integration is accepted by the majority of the population, the number of supporters of the Euro-Atlantic integration is quite low and taking into consideration the persistent debates within Moldovan society concerning its Western or Eastern vector of development, the political elites prefer to avoid touching the topic. However, the consolidation of the national security of the Republic of Moldova is a matter of interest not only for the country itself, but also for the international community and the security of the entire region. In that sense, Moldova’s security and stability directly affects the regional stability at the enlarged eastern borders of EU and NATO. Therefore, the experience of the Central and Eastern Europe proves in many cases that it is unproductive to separate the EU integration from talking the issues of assuring the country’s security that could be provided by the NATO model, other models of affiliation or non-affiliation, as well as the assumed status of neutrality that in different countries is perceived differently. From very beginning the Republic of Moldova proclaimed its neutrality, while it still has on its uncontrolled Eastern territory the Russian troops with a questionable mandate of peace-keepers. The Moldovan society lacks, to a large extent, sufficient knowledge and expertise on this approach and from that prospect the public debates on the security issues and a better understanding of what it means in fact is extremely important, especially in many cases people are not familiar with other models available for example in Switzerland, Austria or Finland. By initiating this project the Moldovan organizers facilitated creation of a space for free discussions on important issues of further development through facilitating access to experience and expertise of the EU member and non-member countries, these practices offering various models valuable to be studied for the benefit of the Moldovan society and the entire region security.

Another major concern for the Moldovan experts dealing with national security and foreign policy matters is the insufficient level of knowledge concerning the international practices in security policy-making. The legacy of the soviet approach is still a “burden” for many of the experts, who find it difficult to move on from the old-thinking patterns and mentality and to accept the truly democratic values and practices. These obstacles are hindering the transition process and are considerably diminishing the impact of international efforts in maintaining security in the region. Considering this, the process of interaction and exchange of experience needs to be further deepened to allow the security professionals and experts from Moldova to be connected to the global mainstream of knowledge in this area. The undertaken roundtable responded to this demand in an efficient and constructive way. Also, it served as additional explanatory approach and gave to Moldovan public the possibility to become familiar with an advanced international experience in the framework of formulating efficient policy on security issues in the Republic of Moldova that were addressed mostly superficially by the previous governments.
Therefore, the Moldovan organizers consider that this initiative served as an efficient exchange of opinions and represented a vital part of the common European efforts for improving the regional cooperation that aims at ensuring the security environment in the region, paying special attention to its challenges and threats and facilitating discussions on the foreign policy strategies that require involvement of all social actors in-charge.

Building on the proposals and suggestions that have been sounded during the roundtable discussions, the participating experts recommended the following actions to be considered by the Moldovan authorities that could contribute to developing initiatives in partnership with public institutions, media and civil society:

- develop effective and transparent procedures to enable the participation of civilians in governmental defense and security institutions and to facilitate cooperation with the expert community and NGOs on developing defense and security policies as well as monitoring their implementation;
- develop a coherent public information policy on defense and security matters with the involvement of civil society and the media;
- raise public awareness on need for security and internal affairs reform, building good governance and respect of human rights, without which the European aspirations of people can't be fulfilled;
- foster dialogue and cooperation between the policy-and decision-makers, media and civil society in exercising overseeing and monitoring of the defense and security sectors that still need serious transformations at large extent.

The experience of the foreign experts shared during discussions was highly appreciated and welcomed by Moldovan experts and authorities, being considered very useful for further fulfillment of Moldova's European aspirations. The themes debated were interesting and challenging, involving participation of relevant experts from Moldova and abroad. It offered the possibility to Moldovan decision-makers and civil society representatives to become familiar with various models of building security and to clarify the notion of neutrality that is stated in Moldova's Constitution, but carries, as the discussions demonstrated, multiple meanings and understandings, creating grounds for interpretations and manipulations. It also familiarized the civil society with the security issues and foreign policy trends within Europe as well as positive examples of building national security that could ensure a certain regional stability. In this way, the roundtable discussions served as an exchange of acquired experiences and represented a vital part of the common efforts for improving the regional cooperation and ensuring the security environment at the EU Eastern border. The Moldovan organizers are confident this initiative contributed strengthening the linkage between civil society and governmental institutions, at national, regional and European level.

In conclusion, the project organizers are thankful to international and national experts who submitted their contributions comprised in this publication that allowed
addressing the key issues of security system and defining its architecture in the EU Eastern Neighborhood, with its challenges and threats. At the same time, the organizers express their gratitude to the EE:PBPP of the Open Society Foundation-London and the Soros Foundation-Moldova that granted the opportunity to implement this initiative. Appearance of this book was also possible due to support provided by the Embassy of Lithuania in Chisinau, as NATO Contact Point, and by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation that co-founded the book publishing in Romanian language, making these materials accessible to a larger public from Moldovan society.

The Pro Marshall Center of the Republic of Moldova is willing to express its hope for a continuous relationship with all actors involved in the implementation of this initiative and for future participation to common events and programs related to national and regional security and other activities to be addressed by the center, searching solutions for issues the society is facing with and developing an efficient cooperation in the future.

Tatiana Busuncian

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THE EXPERIENCE OF THE COUNTRIES FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN BUILDING THE NEW SECURITY SYSTEM
THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP AND ESTONIA:
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

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Importance for Estonia

The European Union’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) establishes a new political instrument for the promotion of democracy and economic reforms in the EU eastern neighborhood. Since the war in Georgia in August 2008 and the gas crisis in the winter of 2008/2009, it has become clear that the developments in Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the South Caucasus have a direct impact on the security of the EU and Estonia, as well. It is, therefore, in the interests of Estonia to provide maximum support for our eastern partners in their reform efforts and convergence with the EU.

The Eastern Partnership targets countries like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The EaP was launched following a proposal made by Sweden and Poland in 2008 to strengthen the eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The joint declaration on the EaP was signed in Prague on May 7, 2009. The values that unite the target countries and the EU include the rule of law, the respect for human rights, the promotion of democracy and deeper engagement of civil society. The EaP is divided into four multilateral platforms:
- Democracy, Good Governance and Stability;
- Economy;
- Energy Security;
- Contacts between People.

What is the importance of the EaP? In recent years, Russia has attempted to increase its sphere of influence over neighboring countries. Moscow wants to control the domestic situation, foreign policy and the economy of former Soviet republics at any cost. By emphasizing European values, the EaP counterbalances Russia’s influence in the region. The EU is offered opportunities for positive engagement of the region due to the EaP.

Ukraine is a key country for the EaP because of its size and geopolitical position. Therefore, assisting Ukraine should be important for Estonia. Estonia should also attach great importance to the South Caucasus, because the falling of the Southern Caucasus energy corridor under Russian control could increase disagreements over topics linked with Russia within the EU and consequently impair the implementation of the European Security and Defense Policy. Estonia is interested in a European
Security and Defense Policy. The adoption of important decisions on Russia-EU relations within bilateral frameworks are not in Estonia’s best interests.

**General recommendations**

The EaP should become an extension of the European Neighborhood Policy. The EaP’s aim is to achieve more than the European Neighborhood Policy. In the long term, the EaP should become the main support mechanism, facilitating convergence between the target countries and the EU.

During the next few months, a practical action plan for the EaP should be prepared under the leadership of the European Commission, so as not to reverse or derail, but accelerate the whole Eastern Partnership process after the Swedish Presidency of the EU. Responsibilities for the EaP within the European Commission should be unambiguous and transparent. The EaP will have a limited scope and will remain merely rhetorical, if it is not unequivocally clear who is responsible for it and what criteria will be used to measure the success of the target countries’ reform efforts. The coordinator of the EaP should, among other things, liaise with other international organizations that already operate in the region (such as UN, NATO, IMF, OSCE) and coordinate the EU’s plans with them.

Estonia should also appoint a concrete unit responsible for the EaP within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, if it has not been done by now. The EaP coordinator in Estonia should initiate new ideas and develop better applications of the EaP for Estonia. The Estonian coordinator should encourage all relevant local agencies and institutions to define in the near future their specific contributions to the different thematic platforms of the EaP.

At the EU level, clear motivators should be provided for the partner countries to fulfill the European integration criteria. Partner countries would be better motivated to implement the reforms necessary for the fulfillment of the EU criteria, if the positive consequences of the changes were defined in a clear and simple manner. This would probably require the drafting of a personal ‘road map’ for every country, setting out the aims of both parties (the EU and a partner country), the means/methods/instruments for the achievement of the aims, the measurement criteria for success and failure and, finally, the positive changes that will take effect after the fulfillment of the criteria (such as concessions, allowances and investments by the EU).

In order to facilitate the visa dialogue, the Schengen visa charge should be waived fully or partially (for students, journalists and business people) as of January 1, 2010.

1. **Democracy, good governance and stability**

Above all, the EU should prioritize the promotion of a progressive political culture in Ukraine and define its requirements and actions concerning the Ukrainian politi-
cal reforms. Within the framework of this thematic platform, the European Commission should underline the significance of formulating and implementing a strategic development plan for regional policy by the Ukrainian central government. The regional policy plan, prepared by the Ukrainian government, should not focus exclusively on economic development, but has to provide a broader perspective and promote the concept of a nation-state, which would be in the interests of all social groups, regardless of their ethnic and religious backgrounds. It should be pointed out to the Ukrainian government by the EU that it might be useful if Kyiv prepared a specific development plan for the future of Crimea so that to ensure peace and stable future for the whole country. Proposing constructive solutions to local problems in Crimea would increase the reliability of the Ukrainian state and government for the Crimean population. Stability of Crimea is significant, because the status of Crimea has a crucial role to play in the security of the Black Sea region and the whole Europe. In a move towards improving the security situation in Crimea, an EU representation should be established in Simferopol. The representation would enhance EU's visibility of the in the region, it would facilitate the EU's active involvement at the local level, the provision of assistance to Crimea and the strengthening of a European identity among the Crimean population. The EU representation in Crimea could, inter alia, provide assistance and guidance on the following areas:

- diversifying the region's economy, especially in Sevastopol;
- supporting tourism;
- improving local infrastructure (network of city streets – street lighting and pavement; roads, railways, cargo ports);
- modernizing the drinking water and waste water treatment systems in cities, towns and villages;
- facilitating dialogue between different communities (e.g. the Crimean Tatars, Russians and Ukrainians);
- promoting European culture (films, theatre, music).

The stability of the Southern Caucasus is closely linked with providing solutions to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Finding a positive solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would provide considerable opportunities for economy and energy security in the whole Southern Caucasus region. In order to stimulate political stability and economic development, the EU should encourage the introduction/launching of a regional trilateral (Georgia-Azerbaijan-Armenia) political and economic cooperation format, for example, a Southern Caucasus Parliamentary Assembly or a Southern Caucasus Chamber for Economic Cooperation and Commerce.

For Georgia, one of the main problems throughout the last five years has been the general instability due to external pressures and the resulting permanent 'state of siege'. The main source of the instability is a security deficit, which can be attributed to foreign pressure. The EU cannot take any concrete steps in the framework of the EaP in order to liquidate this security deficit. All the EU can do here is to express
consistent and unequivocal support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to pursue a non-recognition policy with respect to the occupied territories (Abkhazia and South Ossetia).

One of the crucial systemic shortcomings in Georgia in the context of this thematic platform is the nature of its political culture and the fragmented political landscape. The coalition forces that operate outside the parliament suffer the most as a result of splintering. Georgian political culture is in essence more inclined towards conflicts and zero-sum games than towards compromises and positive engagement. This is one of the main reasons why the opposition has been divided and unable to cooperate, which, in its turn, has prevented the opposition from participating in parliamentary politics effectively and in a coordinated manner. This has led to the domination of Saakashvili’s United National Movement over policy-making at state level. In addition, there are numerous other factors that contribute to these social processes (nepotism as a characteristic feature of Georgian culture, as well as patriarchal tendencies).

For these reasons, the EU should launch programmes within the EaP framework to raise the level of Georgian political culture, including the opposition forces and the ruling party. The programmes should be, first and foremost, of practical nature, demonstrating European political culture and European public administration practices by way of personal participation. More specifically, Georgian mid-level politicians and civil servants should be offered traineeships at EU institutions (e.g. the European Parliament) or at EU member state institutions. Like language learning through language immersion programmes, an approach based on personal observations and participation – so-called ‘policy immersion’ or ‘administrative immersion’ – would facilitate the “Europeanization” of the behavioral patterns and values upheld by Georgian politicians.

At the same time, the central government in Georgia should be pressured to continue its practical reform efforts to promote democracy and good governance (especially legislative and judicial reforms). Clear and measurable criteria should be set to track progress in this field. More efforts should be made to increase the authority of the ombudsman institution in Georgia and to depoliticize that position.

Azerbaijan is in essence a classic example of dynastic autocracy. It is complicated to have constructive working relations with Baku while promoting democracy and good governance that anticipates a regime change in Azerbaijan. Hence the keyword for Azerbaijan is ‘stability.’ This does not mean, however, that the EU should give up on democracy and good governance in Azerbaijan. The question is rather what priority level is assigned to these issues and what kinds of instruments are used to bring them about. In the context of democracy and good governance in Azerbaijan, we would recommend to focus on the promotion of civil society and contacts between people.

For Belarus, we recommend to consider opportunities of positive engagement in cooperation with Ukraine. Sharing joint reform experiences with Ukraine could ap-
ply a similar working format as Nordic-Baltic joint development aid in the Balkans. The focus for Belarus should be at general contact-building with mid-level government experts and at increasing their links with European democracies as many levels as possible. For start, neutral issues such as economic reform, general capacity building for institutions, managing government archives, crisis management and disaster coordination system, civil emergency planning should be preferred, while topics such as human rights, free media and democracy should be kept at a much lower profile.

2. Economy
It is important that business activities of small and medium enterprises are supported and encouraged in all EaP countries. Special focus should be at rural areas, in the agricultural sector and in the Black Sea region. We would particularly emphasize the importance of assisting alternative commercial activities in Sevastopol, where the possible departure of the Black Sea Fleet in 2017 can cause a significant decrease in economic activity, because currently, around 70% of the population of Sevastopol is directly or indirectly employed by the Russian Black Sea Fleet. One possible overall objective for this thematic platform is to facilitate the opening of the European market by securing the conformity of local products to quality standards.

From a more general perspective, it is important that legislative measures together with appropriate implementation mechanisms are defined to promote the creation of a transparent business environment and to root out top-level corruption. This objective also concerns democracy and good governance, as well as the media environment and journalistic professionalism.

The activities of small and medium enterprises offering tourism and recreational services should be, especially, stimulated in areas around the Black Sea. That region has a great potential, yet it does not attract foreign tourists at the moment.

A free trade agreement is of critical importance to Georgia.

3. Energy security
Ukraine should be required to take specific steps to reform its energy sector and to increase the transparency of its energy policy decisions. Also, Ukraine should be offered continued support in achieving closer integration with the European energy market, as well as in the modernization of Ukraine’s gas transit system.

From EU’s perspective, Georgia and Azerbaijan have a central role to play in securing access to the energy resources (natural gas and oil) of Central Asian countries – Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Georgia and Azerbaijan are part of the ‘transport corridor’, through which the above resources are brought to European markets. However, the two countries differ in some aspects. Azerbaijan, in addition to being a transit country, is also an important exporter of energy resources. Georgia has no
gas or oil fields, but it holds a central position in the Southern Caucasus transit route for energy resources. As an alternative to the Black Sea ports located on the territory of Georgia and the pipelines running through Georgia, transit routes go through Russia or Turkey (and Iran).

It would be undesirable for the EU if the energy markets of Georgia and Azerbaijan were to fall under the Russian sphere of influence. If the proportion of Russian energy supplies were to increase, it would have a political and psychological effect on the EU, which could contribute to internal divisions in the EU and damage the trust between EU member states. In addition, such a development would probably affect the implementation and effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

In recent years, Turkey has become much more economically and politically active in its closer neighborhood. At the same time, during the last five or six years, Turkey has ceased to view itself as a component of a future political and economic architecture in Europe or as a partner for the EU, but rather as an autonomous regional superpower. If this trend continues in the medium-term perspective, the EU could find itself in a situation where it has to compete with Turkey’s economic and political ambitions in both the Greater Middle East and the South Caucasus. This would also affect matters related to energy security.

4. Contacts between people

In general, more information about the EU should be made available under this thematic platform. Increasing the number of EU information points in the region would help to avoid the problem of non-implementation of EaP initiatives due to a lack of knowledge about the existence of the initiatives. Teaching of English and French in EaP countries should be supported extensively in order to enable international cross-sectoral cooperation and to facilitate retraining. Deeper engagement of civil society could involve the raising of awareness among citizens of how they could contribute to civil society and exercise their control function over governments concerning the fulfillment of reform criteria.

More efforts should be made to distribute information about EU academic exchange and aid programmes; increase student exchange programmes and study visits; advertise more extensively opportunities about volunteer programmes involving the EU and EaP countries; and enable EU-supported traineeship programmes for journalists (at European media corporations).

More information about the developments in EU member states would make Europe more attractive in areas dominated by Russian mass media that is financed by the Kremlin. Contacts, cooperation and visits between the European Parliament and the Crimean Parliament should be continued.

The EU should establish a foundation for the development of new free media, which would encourage the setting up of new web-based portals, would provide
free Internet access in public areas and would support portals that translate Western news into local languages and local news into English. In Crimea, Moldova and Belarus, the EU should support oppositional i.e. pro-Europe print media and assist pro-Europe TV channels that were to be broadcasted outside the capitals of EaP countries.
First of all, it should be noted that Lithuania's membership in NATO strengthened its structural security in a very durable way, and today Lithuania feels safer than it did before accession. Still, new problematic questions appear on the security agenda of the country today, especially regarding its relations with Russia.

To be honest, it is very hard to imagine that something similar to Georgia war with Russia may happen in Lithuanian case, but the history of international relations proves that even most unexpected events may become reality one day. So, as security wisdom says, the country should be always prepared for the worst scenario. And in this context, the main question (doubt) that Lithuania must somehow deal with is the following: Is NATO politically and militarily ready to protect Lithuania in case of Russian aggression against it?

From the first glance, this question may seem very strange. In fact the realities of international politics have changed and the situation in the sphere of political unity of NATO members is very complicated. Let's start from the US position as a main strategic partner of Lithuania (at least from Vilnius' point of view). In Lithuania, there is a rough impression that America left the whole CIS area to Russia, as its traditional sphere of influence. There are some discussions about a time period of such decision: is it a temporary step or a long term strategy in the context of “reset” with Russia? But there is little debate about the fact that America is out of CIS area today (not as active as it was there before). The main example of such a conclusion is the case of the Ukraine, where the United States did not participate actively in presidential elections, won by the pro-Russian candidate V. Janukovich in the end. And today, the Ukraine is on its way to become a Russian satellite.

Still this is not the whole story. America is leaving Europe too. The main sign of such a hypothesis is the fact that “old European countries” are strengthening their cooperation with Russia without any shame and attention to the concerns of other EU states in this context. For example, Germany goes on with building the controversial North Stream gas pipeline. France is going to sell Russia the military ship (!) “Mistral”, and supports Russian South Stream gas pipeline project, which makes the mission of the energetic encirclement of Europe almost completed. Italian Prime Minister S. Berlusconi seems to be just in love with V. Putin and Russia. Many European countries (particularly East European states) do not support the mentioned ones which mean the absence of solidarity towards Russia in the West.
No solidarity – no confidence! Keeping in mind all the things mentioned above, Lithuania is not (cannot be) sure that America (and Great Britain as its reflection in Europe), Germany, France and Italy, as the most powerful members of NATO, will be willing to protect it from Russia, sacrificing their own interests. Anyway, it would be extremely difficult to explain to the Americans (much tired of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), Germans, French and Italians why they should go and fight for a country with such a difficult name to pronounce, and which is located somewhere in the middle of nowhere (not to mention about the fact that “these Baltics are so annoying in their crazy will to provoke Russia any time they can”).

Putting aside the political aspect of the problem, its military part is not less worrying. There is not enough space to present all peculiarities in this paper, but, definitely, in case of Russian military aggression against Lithuania, it would be very difficult for NATO to free it from Russian troops. A full-scale and very sophisticated operation would have to be put in action, and the main European armies are hardly prepared for such intervention today. Also, what is important to be mentioned is that American forces are still busy in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other side, Russians are investing more and more into their army, in its technical capacity and training. Besides, NATO does not even have a defence plan(s) for Baltic states. This matter is still under discussion and “old Europeans” are against its adoption in order not to provoke Russia.

So who can say that Lithuania does not have the right to question NATO’s will and ability to protect it in case of a possible aggression from Russian side!? Day by day NATO becomes less and less unified and less powerful, and still it does not pay enough attention to new types of threats: energetic and humanitarian. It is no secret that Russia tends to use its energy resources as an argument in its relations with the closest neighbours (see examples of the Ukraine and Belarus). Lithuania also has some difficulties in this context, and always (together with Poland) underlines the necessity to make the energetic security a part of NATO’s responsibility.

The humanitarian aspect is even more important. Today, you do not need tanks any more if you control the mind of the people and if you are able to form their identity. Again, it should be clear for everyone that Russia is more and more active in creating its positive image worldwide and in discrediting its opponents (the main prove is the fact that it succeeded to change the world’s opinion about the war in Georgia). CIS area, where a lot of Russians and Russian speaking people reside, is an object of Moscow’s special attention, because the so called “compatriots” can be used as an effective instrument of pressure on the government of the country they live in. And again, NATO does not want to see this fundamental (civil) threat, and understand that it has already been influenced by this threat.

Countries who want to enter NATO and EU are usually too romantic about the place they want to get in. These romantic features may be called: belief, hope and love. Lithuania is already not that naive as it used to be. Today, it sees the limits of the
Western security guarantees. It is better to be in NATO than not to be, of course, but still, the development tendency is not positive. So, all states that still want to become NATO members should be aware of the risks and realities they will meet there. That is why it is very important for them not just to trust in absolute manner the Western allies, but keep in mind the context (geographical, political and economic) they live in. This means that the key factor is good relations with the closest neighbours, especially if one of them is Russia.

**Proposals for Moldova**

Moldova has one big problem to solve and a great goal to achieve. The problem is Transnistria. The goal is EU. But the successful solving of Transnistria problem is definitely not a guarantee for EU membership. Of course, formal unification of the country and fulfilment of reforms, which Moldova needs to implement in accordance with EU standards, would help a lot to enter the EU. But **accomplished reforms and conquered separatism can still be not enough for the European Union to accept Moldova to the club.** The last fact should be very clear for all political powers in Moldova.

Today EU is really tired of enlargement and all its external initiatives are aimed to keep out those who want to join it, rather than to bring them in. That is why Europeans do not promise anything to wishful candidates anymore, but they try to suggest the applicants something instead of membership (like ENP and EPP), and put very high requirements for them, knowing that it will take a long time for such countries like Moldova to implement all of them properly. And even then, the EU’s political decision may be negative because of some reason (for example because of relations with Russia, which tries to regain its power in CIS area and strongly opposes Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations of the states belonging to it, including Moldova).

**Still, the absence of the EU membership guarantee does not mean that Moldova has no stimulus to implement reforms.** It is great that such an understanding prevails in Chisinau. Pro-European coalition members realize that the successful process of the Europeanization of Moldova will definitely make it more attractive for citizens of Transnistria (but not for the leaders, they are not so important). In this case, seeing real advantages of Moldovan direction comparing to their situation, they will be more ready for *de facto* integration to Moldova, a phenomenon which is already taking place. Again – it is great that Moldovan politicians came to the conclusion that the policy of sanctions and ignorance only complicates the problem and strengthens Tiraspol leadership.

Despite the fact that the mentioned process can take a long time, leaders of Moldova should avoid temptation to fix the problem fast using external instruments. Today Moldova is neutral, according to its Constitution. Denying this status in order to bring NATO/EU into the Transnistria conflict would be a big mistake and
give nothing positive. Moreover, this might bring a complicated constructive path towards success, and intensify the national (today only 1/5 of Moldovan citizens would vote for NATO membership) and regional (tough reaction of Russia, which has many leverages to influence Moldova) tensions. Those in Moldova who support westernization of the conflict, as many East European countries suggest (including Lithuania), perhaps do not understand that NATO and EU will not want to sacrifice their relations with Russia in favour of small and strategically unimportant Republic of Moldova. So, underlying the need to bring NATO into Transnistria conflict, Moldova will get many additional problems:

- Probable disappearance of support for pro-European political powers and EU membership idea as related to these powers (and as a result Moldova can make a step back to a new political crisis, authoritarian Communist party rule and economic stagnation);
- Very negative view of Transnistrian citizens towards Moldova (and as a result complicated process of their integration into Moldovan society);
- Possible economic sanctions and other limitative actions from the Russian side – AND NO RESULT IN THE END!

So, the main priority for Moldova should remain the consistent implementation of reforms in accordance with EU standards that can strengthen the Chisinau’s goal to enter European Union and help to successfully accomplish the mission of factual integration of Transnistria into Moldova. It should not be in a hurry, and it will be a prize winner.

P.S. In the end a few words about alternatives for Moldova. Today its EU orientation is clear, but EU membership is not guaranteed, and Russia’s plans to reintegrate CIS members with Moscow are evident. So, Moldova may want something different from the Russian perspective, but in the end stand in front of it. In fact it will face a challenge of “Finlandization” and integration into institutions controlled by Russia (Collective Security Treaty Organization and Customs Union). Would it be a catastrophe for Moldova? We cannot say that. The implementation of reforms would make Moldova a developed country anyway, and it can feel itself comfortable in any structure or geopolitical system. So, the suggestion for Moldova is to go on with its reforms and seek closer relations with EU, without complicating its relations with Russia at the same time (particularly not seeking NATO membership). You never know what big players can decide in your case, but you should try to be prepared for any situation.
BULGARIAN EXPERIENCE IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM

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Introduction

It is widely recognized that the Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a key step in the transformation of totalitarian states into democratic ones. In the last 15-20 years the issues of SSR are a high priority in many countries, including the new NATO and EU member-states and partner nations. The approach and experience of each nation is unique. There is no universal strategy for implementation of such a large scale and multifaceted reform.

Scientists and security experts share a common view that SSR is aimed at the transformation of the security system, including all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and activities, with the aim to be managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance. It is also concerned with a more efficient use of scarce resources to improve security. The overall objective of SSR is to contribute to a secure environment that is conducive to development of the country.

SSR addresses security problems and tries to improve the situation through institutional reforms. Security and peace are seen as a public good. Society as a whole, as well as its individual members, benefits from better security.

Democratic, civilian control over security forces is crucial for the provision of security in the interests of the population. The key issue in the reform of the security sector is the development of both effective civil oversight and creation of institutions capable of providing security.

SSR cannot be accomplished without strong political commitment and coordinated efforts of politicians, administration, business and civil society. It is difficult to develop a universal strategy for SSR but there are a number of principles and steps that, if applied, can guarantee a strong foundation in the evolution of an effective security sector.
Difficult and non-coordinate start of the Bulgarian SSR

Bulgaria recognizes that the SSR has two key dimensions – military and civilian, without underestimation of other dimensions (economic, social and institutional).

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 left Bulgaria alone to face Turkey and Greece, two states Bulgaria was supposed to confront militarily in the event of war during the Cold war. Without any external security guarantees, Bulgaria became increasingly concern about military imbalances in the region. The country attempted to ensure its national security by enhancing national military power and improving relations with neighboring states and Russia.

The political dimension of SSR is associated with the democratic, civilian oversight of the security sector. The key task of the reform in this area is to guarantee good governance and the involvement of the civil society in the debate on security issues and civilian oversight over the security sector[1].

In early 1990s Bulgaria initiated its SSR without any theoretical model or practice for such large-scale transformation. The core of this reform in Bulgaria was the re-definition of the political role, judicial basis, roles and missions of the Armed Forces, the Special Services and the other institutions of the national security sector[2]. The first reforms within the security sector involved the civilian dimension of the security sector and were aimed at restructuring of the Police, the Security services, the courts and the penal systems, interior forces, border police and customs services. As a result of the reorganization and restructuring of the communist security services, new ones were established at the beginning of the security sector reform process - National Intelligence Service, in 1990 and National Protection Service, in 1992. A new Law on Ministry of Interior approved was approved in 1991. Despite of the depoliticization of the security structures and the restructuring of the security sector, the dominance of the former state security and intelligence agencies in the new bodies continued for a long time. With some exceptions, the new structures were headed by former security and intelligence executives. Later on, in 2001 a State Agency for Civil Protection and in 2002 a State Agency for the Protection of Classified Information were established.

With the Constitution of 1991, some elements of the security sector were subordinated to different institutions to establish a balance. The National Intelligence Service and the National Guard Service are under the President and the rest under the Government and the Prime minister.

The core security institutions within the Bulgarian security sector initially were the Bulgarian Army (Armed Forces, including Military Police and Counterintelligence, and Military Intelligence service), National Intelligence Service, National Security Service, National Police Service, National Service of Gendarmerie, National Border Police Service, National Guard Service, National Service of Combating Organized Crime and National Service of Fire and Emergency Safety. The parliamentary,
judicial and penalty systems, administrative structures, responsible for the democratic control and oversight of these institutions however, were not deeply involved in the reformation process. This was one of the key reason the organized crime and corruption to flourish in Bulgaria.

Until 1998, SSR in Bulgaria was not guided by an agreed vision/concept and principles amongst the political parties and the society. Political consensus on security issues and policies emerged only in 2000[3]. From 2000 till 2007 Bulgaria's transition has been guided by the national priorities of achieving membership in NATO and the EU. An effective SSR became a prerequisite for eventual accession to both alliances. Bulgaria, however, was too late in the demilitarization of Police and some other security institutions.

In 2008 a further reform in the security sector established a State Agency for National Security under the Prime Minister, which integrated the civilian and military counterintelligence services and other investigation bodies.

The lack of a National Security Strategy (concept), however, shaped the uncoordinated start of the reform process with no long-term objectives. Finally in 1998 the National strategic concept was approved and provided strategic guidance in the development of the security sector. This strategic concept, however, is already outdated. Two attempts, in 2005 and 2008, to approve a new national security strategy failed. This year, the current government developed a new version of this highly needed strategic guiding document, which is now under a public consideration and it is expected to be approved in the next months.

Today the parliamentary control and oversight of the security sector is realized by three key commissions: Foreign policy and Defense commission, Commission on internal security and public order, Commission on the control of the State Agency on national security.

In 2002, the need for a law on National Security was widely recognized. It had to define security as an integral service, the structure of the security sector, its management and civil control. Such a law was expected in 2003 but up to now is not a reality yet.

**The Bulgarian Defense Reform**

The Cold war left Bulgaria with a burdensome legacy of large, obsolete and costly defense structures and the need to be reshaped and cut down to size was obvious. The Defense Reform, however, started relatively late. In 1995 a new Law on Defense and Armed Forces was approved by the Parliament, but without significant changes in the force structures. Finally, the new government of 1998, after the approval of the National Security Concept in the same year and the National Military Doctrine in 1999, initiated a large-scale and comprehensive defense reform. This reform is characterized with a radical downsizing and reorganization of our Armed Forces.
First defense reform Plan 2004 was approved in 2000 and updated in 2002; a Strategic Defense Review was conducted in 2003. In 2004 a long-term Force Development plan (Plan 2015) was approved. The Armed Forces were downsized from 117,000 in 1989 to 45,000 in 2004 and further to 32,000 people in 2009 and dramatic reductions in major weapon systems followed. At the end of 2008, the major weapon systems were cut to the following levels: combat tanks – 160; armed combat vehicles – 378; artillery pieces with caliber 100 mm and above – 192; combat and combat training aircraft – 42; transport aircraft – 10; attack helicopters – 12; transport helicopters – 18; navy combat ships – 6; combat support ships – 16 and navy helicopters – 6. Further cuts of the weapon systems will be done in the coming years.

The following short description of the phases of the Bulgarian Defense Reform outlines the key development [5].

**1990-1996**

Specific to this phase was a lack of political guidance, lack of competence of the civilian administration of the MoD, full dominance of the General Staff in defense issues, preservation of old force structures, initial bilateral and international participation in international missions. Key developments were:

- Law on Consultative Council on National Security to the President;
- First democratically elected government with the first civilian Minister of Defense - 1991;
- First Bulgarian participation in UN peacekeeping operation, 1992;
- Bulgaria joined PfP – 1994;
- Bulgaria joined PARP – 1995;
- New Law on Defense and Armed Forces – 1995 (amended 36 times until 2009);

**1997-2001**

The new government of the democratic forces demonstrated a clear and strong political will for reforms, increased competence of the civilian administration of the MoD, direct commitment and involvement in the defense reform of the Prime Minister through the Security Council. An internal capacity for strategic defense review and defense planning was build, better integration of MoD and the General Staff was achieved, more realistic reform and integration plans were developed, enhanced and proactive bilateral and regional cooperation was established. The key developments were:

- Decision of the provisional government Bulgaria to join NATO, Feb 1997;
- Government decision to establish inter-ministerial Committee for NATO in-
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tegration, Feb 1997;
- Government decision for approval of the first National NATO Accession Program, March 1997;
- Approval of the first long-term Force development plan (Plan 2010), without discussion by the government and the Parliament, 1998;
- Parliament voted the first National Security Concept, April 1998;
- Security Council to the prime-minister established with the Government decree, 1998;
- Amendments to the Law on Defense and Armed Forces, 1997-1998;
- Foreign defense and military consultancy established, 1998-1999;
- Joint US-Bulgarian Defense Reform Study, 1999;
- First Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria, April 1999;
- Active regional cooperation and HQ of MPFSEE activated in Bulgaria;
- Defense Reform “Plan 2004”, approved by the Government in October 1999;
- Bulgarian MAP approved by the Government in October 1999;
- Program of social adaptation for the retired military started in cooperation between the administration, NGO, business and international organizations, 2000;
- Initiation of the program-based defense and force planning (21 comprehensive programs) – 1999-2000;
- First annual reports on National security and Defense and Armed Forces, 2000;
- First concepts and doctrines for the Armed Forces and services developed, 2000-2001;
- Initial reform of the Military Education System, 2000-2001;
- Increased harmonization of the national with NATO defense and force planning, 2001;
- Force structure review and Adapted Plan 2004, 2001;
- Force modernization study, 2001;
- First draft of the White Paper on Defense and Armed Forces, 2001;
- First conceptual and doctrinal document for the Armed Forces developed, 2000-2001

2002-2009

The next two governments continued the defense reform, but with less rigor and commitment.

Within this phase the two national foreign policy priorities were achieved – membership in NATO and EU. Bulgaria had to accelerate the defense reform to fully
comply with NATO standards and to successfully integrate into the Alliance political and military structures. Key developments were:

- Amended Military Doctrine, 2002;
- White Paper on Defense and Armed Forces, 2002;
- Force management study for further optimization of Defense management procedures and structures, 2002;
- Military strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2002;
- Strategic Defense Review, 2003
- Accession of Bulgaria to NATO, 29 March 2004;
- Increased participation in NATO and EU-led crisis management operations, 2004-current;
- Force Development Plan 2015, in 2004;
- Modernization plan 2015, in 2004;
- Accession of Bulgaria to EU, 01 January 2007;
- Updated Force Development Plan (2018), 2008;
- New Force Structure established;
- New Law on Defense and armed Forces adopted, 2009
- Integrated MoD and Defense Staff - 2009

**2010- current**

The new government of August 2009 started a critical analysis of the defense policy and force development and initiated a Strategic Defense Review.

- National Security Strategy 2010 (draft under public discussion);
- Alignment of defense structures(under way);
- Strategic Defense Review, 2010 (ongoing);

**Lessons Learned from the Bulgarian SSR**

There are a number of positive and negative lessons learned from the Bulgarian SSR process.

1. Security sector reform needs a strong and continuous political commitment and management. The role of the political consensus, guidance and political will to implement SSR is crucial.
2. From management point of view, the key to SSR are the personalities of ministers and other political executives. Modern management capacity is needed for effective and timely SSR.
3. High professionalism and motivation are needed for the security sector staff.
4. Strong legal foundation is required for the SSR.
5. Long-term planning and continuity are of vital importance for the SSR.
6. Transparency, media and civil society involvement are crucial for the success of the SSR.
7. Reorganization and downsizing are not enough for successful defense reform.
8. Accountability system, strong checks and balances inside and outside of the security sector are of great importance.
9. Without parallel and effective reforms in the judicial and penal systems, SSR is in danger to fail.
10. Comprehensive democratic and civilian control is of vital importance for successful SSR.
11. Important role of education, training and personnel policy – to select and motivate the right people.
12. Important role of progress reports to control the process and gain support and motivation.
13. Law enforcement is still week point in the SSR in Bulgaria.

**Conclusion**

The Bulgarian SSR is far from completion. A lot still remain to be done in most of the sectors, especially in the judicial and penal systems. Today a number of reform activities are under way in the defense sector, police, judiciary, security services, public and citizen's security. The organized crime and corruption in the country are under a strong pressure. The final phase of the defense reform is underway.

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SECURITY CONCERNS
FOR THE CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE

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In order to shape the framework of the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, I would like to stress out the following five points.

1. **First**, let us notice some new **Phenomenon** happening in the recent years:
   - The **Kosovo independence** – is the foregoing of the **formation of new states on the territory of a sovereign state** (after a real Milosevic genocide and the legitimate intervention of the international community, who decided to take over the administration of the sovereignty of Serbia on the territory of Kosovo, where ethnical cleansing and genocide took place, according to the 1244 Resolution of the UN Security Council, but also a unilateral declaration of independence, recognized by several states –the US and the majority of EU states);
   - Russia is moving from **Western integration** and **common values** to **“Euro-Asiatic” paradigm** - isolationism, nationalism, and the will to regain the **“great power” status**, based on petro-dollars.
   - NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008. Georgia and Ukraine were denied a MAP status, but were granted with the future eventual accession to the Alliance. This resolution of the Alliance in its final declaration was challenged by Moscow;
   - The Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 and the consecutive recognition of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states by Russia. It is the first war for **changing the borders by military force** in Europe after the Cold War (and Helsinki 1975 CSCE provisions), and the **first war of the Russian Federation outside its borders** after Afghanistan / considering the succession of Soviet Union – the Russian Federation, established in December 1991 at the fall of the USSR;
   - The Eastern Partnership of the EU, launched in May 2009 (after the Black Sea Synergy in March 2007), were projects complementing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and discussing both bilateral links and cooperation between those states and EU-member states in areas like common market, visa liberalization and visa free regime, energy security and others, marking the stages of integration with the European Union. The project was contested by Moscow;
   - The Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2009. **Energy as a political tool in action was reconfirmed**, harming directly EU-member states. It was the 19th incident of this kind, and the third major after 2005/2006 Russia-Belarus oil crisis
and 2006/2007 Russia-Ukraine crisis. The crisis underlined the important problems of any system put in place to prevent sudden supplies’ cut to EU consumers and the lack of respect for previous commitments, and forged the ideas of the European Energy Security Policy to avoid any dependence and compensate any supplies’ cut to EU member states;

- Foreign Affairs Strategy, Defence Doctrine, Military and Nuclear Doctrine of the Russian Federation (September 2008 –February 5th, 2010). Russia confirmed unilaterally its intention to use military intervention outside the borders for the protection of Russian interests (Russia’s interests, interests of the Russian citizens and those of Russian compatriots) and the use of the first nuclear strike in regional conventional wars that challenge the existence and interests of the Russian state;

- New European Security Chart proposed by Kremlin (Arbatov Group proposal by Serghei Karaganov, then the official Medvedev proposal) – which confirmed the will of Russia to regain the status of superpower, the sphere of special interests, limited sovereignty in post-soviet space, the Russian veto in global affairs, European-Russian separate security agreements and US out of Europe;

- Negotiation and signing of a new START 2 Treaty (9 April 2010), for the control and diminishing number of nuclear weapons, with the zero option for an objective, according to Obama’s agenda. The nuclear deal was followed by the dispute on the Missile Defence limitation and inclusion in the treaty, linked with the offensive weapons;

- Towards a nuclear Iran (September 2009-2010). Russia and China protecting Iran’s future status, against non-proliferation rules. Then we have to note the agreement of the Security Council on a new Resolution of embargo towards Iran, followed by Russia’s support for opening the Bushewer Nuclear power plant;

- The first financial crisis in the Euro zone – the Greek bailout, and the reaction of Germany privileging its own interest to the EU’s one. In March 2010, ECOFIN and the informal meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs acknowledge this change to a “Germany first” approach instead of a “EU first” previous policy;

- The Kharkov Agreement prolonging the presence of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and agreeing the change of capabilities and improve the generation of capabilities in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, launching a race for arming in the littoral states of the Black Sea Region;

- The Medvedev-Yanukovich agreement on Transnistria. The agreement granted Ukrainian involvement, including involvement with troops in Transnistria, and imposed permanent neutrality to a third state, the Republic of Moldova;

- The Merkel-Medvedev memorandum agreeing on an EU-Russia Security formal instrument, in spite of the contrary decision of the EU Council (as in NATO NAC) rejecting the discussion on Medvedev Security Chart proposal – and the Russia’s revision document– and assigning it to the OSCE framework.
2. Under the circumstances of the previous phenomenon, EU and the West moved to consider four **themes of reflection** for Western partners – including the members of NATO and EU from Central and Eastern Europe:

- **the future of Western Alliances** – through the NATO Strategic Concept to be adopted in Lisbon in November 2010, and the NATO final declaration at the Lisbon Summit; EU after enlargement fatigue, the economic and financial crisis, the Lisbon Treaty institutional transformation, and the launch of the EU Foreign Affairs Service; as well as reflection on what is happening with the transatlantic link, and with US presence in Europe;

- How to address a more **assertive, offensive and revisionist Russia**, based on the Spheres of Interest in post-soviet space and its 4 track addresses of Europe (as follows: 1) Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia should be controlled; 2) Central Asia, Republic of Moldova, Caucasus are easy to control and Moscow will move to do so; 3) The Baltic States, Eastern Europe could be in control and Moscow will try to do so; and 4) Turkey, France, Italy, Germany are European partners, easy to influence);

- **Rewriting the rules of Security in Europe?** Do we still have valid agreements from the Paris Chart for a New Europe, 1999 OSCE Chart for Security in Europe or not?: – Should we defend the *status quo*, should we make *tabula rasa* and renegotiate the security in Europe (the 1975 Helsinki agreement took 10 years to be negotiated, and what will happen until the new agreement comes in force; what should we do with the provisions and commitments which were not observed and with the actors doing so, should we move to new agreements or first wait for a full compliance with those documents before moving to a new agreement) or should we negotiate some points in the former agreements in order to somehow accommodate and respect Russia’s demands?

- How do EU, NATO, and USA **address the new democracies**? Do those states that supported democratic changes have a responsibility in front of the new democratic states? Is there a realistic affirmation of their independence when it comes to a possibility of clash with Moscow’s interests to take over security, defence and foreign affairs policies in the post-soviet states, and then involvement in energy policies and take-overs in the majority ownership of lucrative economic companies in the region?

3. **Russia’s instruments for dependence and “limited sovereignty”** for post-soviet states (Breznev doctrine renewed, Putin doctrine and Medvedev documents):

- limiting NATO aspiration, and cooperation of the post-soviet states with the Alliance;

- limiting EU cooperation in energy security, ESDP cooperation;

- stopping any Security Sector Reform, international cooperation / Western cooperation in that matter;
officials linked to Moscow, imposed and appointed in key positions in those countries: Ministers of Defence, Intelligence, and Internal Affairs, Councillors of Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ministers of Defence, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Internal Affairs, Supreme Council for Defence and Security:

- Moscow’s political control of some parties, and some parliamentary committees in some Parliaments of those countries;
- Intelligence affairs control;
- mafia and criminal activities leadership control;
- trafficking and smuggling leadership control, and taking profit from this activity;
- energy control, energy security projects blocked or missing;
- economic take-overs of lucrative branches, especially those linked to energy consumption imported from Russia – oil, gas, and electric energy.

4. As a main issue of reflection we have quoted the future of Western Alliances. This is not about Russia or the Central Eastern European states, it is about EU’s future and the European solidarity clause applied by important EU states, first and foremost by Germany. This comes with another process, namely Germany that seeks to maximize its own interests, which is not a process that can necessarily unify in the best way the rest of the continent. Berlin is no longer willing to contribute financially or put its geopolitical interests on hold for the sake of the rest of the EU member states.

This puts into question a number of long-standing “agreements” that have forged the European consensus for nearly 60 years:

- The first is the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which has been the bedrock of the Franco-German alliance since the European Union’s beginnings as the European Economic Community. The CAP was mainly negotiated in the 1950s to open up the French consumer market to German manufactured products in exchange for transfer payments that would support French agriculture;

- The second issue is the so-called U.K. rebate. The rebate was negotiated by Thatcher in the mid-1980s as a way to compensate London for not receiving almost any of the funds from the CAP, which at the time made up 70 percent of the EU budget. The rebate is only around 6 billion euro a year, but it is a symbolic issue because it gives London the compensation for its contributions to the bloc – a compensation that Germany certainly does not get;

- Germany’s relationship with Russia is a third major upcoming issue, where Berlin looking out for its own issues could be a problem for its neighbours, specifically Central and Eastern Europe. Germany has historically allied with Russia on numerous occasions to the detriment of Central Europe. A Berlin looking out for its own interests rarely picks fights with Russia for the sake of Central and Eastern Europe’s security.
This is becoming clear to Central and Eastern Europe as Germany meets Russia’s resurgence in the region — particularly in Ukraine and Georgia — with indifference. Furthermore, Berlin is strengthening its energy relationship with Russia by building the North Stream natural gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea. This pipeline cuts Central and Eastern Europe out of the Berlin-Moscow energy relationship, making it far easier for Germany to ignore its neighbours’ future complaints over Russian actions in the region.

This may be the most serious problem of all for Central and Eastern Europe, who consider Russia their top security threat, since one of the main perceived benefits of EU membership has been that it provides not only economic benefits but also a sense of belonging to the “West”. In many ways, it is the flip side of NATO membership, tying former Soviet satellites with Western Europe in an economic, security and military alliance.

**If Central and Eastern European member states begin to feel that Germany is not willing to step up to the challenges presented by Russian resurgence in the region, membership in the European bloc will lose any pretence of furthering their security or military interests, pushing them for security agreement with the United States.**

5. Conclusions:
- For the post-soviet states, the points of dependence from Russia quoted above gave the Western states the indicators and signals to establish to what extend a country is dependent or independent, sovereign in real terms or with limited sovereignty;
- These assessments and the behaviour of each country with Western institutions are defining the degree of openness and integration that will be given to each particular country — “Variable geometry approach”;
- Monitoring and continuous assessment: The parameters will be surveyed in time, with updates of the each country’s evolution. Sustainability is a part of the assessment and it is the consequent decision;
- The geographic contiguity is going to play a major role. Each country will be judged according to its own merits, but every policy will address a group of countries. Two countries could be privileged by this approach: the Republic of Moldova – if changes allow being included in the Western Balkans package (still limited chances), and Ukraine, due to its strategic weight and importance for the West, but it depends on the internal appetite for reforms and independence.
THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: NATIONAL SECURITY FUTURE AND EUROPEAN ASPIRATIONS
The Republic of Moldova – Perspectives of the Regional Security Consolidation

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The Republic of Moldova proclaimed its independence on 27 August 1991, when the USSR disappearance seemed to be an inevitable. Transformation of the former Soviet republic – the Moldavian SSR – to an independent state involved solving three major problems simultaneously:

- Building up structures of a functioning and democratic rule of law in the former Moldavian SSR;
- Transforming an insignificant part of the former economic complex, located in the former Moldavian SSR, to a national economy of the new state, based on market economy principles;
- Transformation of the population (citizens of the USSR) of the former Moldavian SSR to the loyal and conscious citizens’ community of the new independent state.

At present (mid-2010), the conclusion is that none of these three issues is resolved. The transformation of the former Soviet republic into an independent state has been accompanied by political confrontation, violence and external interference that seriously affected the process of building-up the Moldovan state. As a result of several negative factors’ interference, both external and internal ones, the conclusion is that the political project of building-up the Moldovan state, in the borders of the former Moldavian SSR, continues to be unfinished and contested.

Currently the Republic of Moldova is facing a set of threats to its national security, which in turn, causes obvious risks at the regional level. Thus, for example, the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 immediately provoked questions whether the same scenario may recur in the Republic of Moldova (under the conditions of the illegal presence of Russian troops in Moldova, and the existence of non-constitutional regime in the Eastern region of the Republic of Moldova (Transnistria)).

The existence of the Transnistrian conflict is not only an issue for the Republic of Moldova. On 27 January 2010, five officers of the Russian secret services have been arrested on the territory of Odessa region, who tried to obtain secret information from a citizen of Ukraine. The worst is that some of these officers were officially in their due service in the Transnistrian region, where subversive activities were carried out against Ukraine. This means that the Russian Federation takes advantage of the unsettled Transnistrian conflict to carry out subversive activities, including those against Ukraine.
After the collapse of the USSR, the Republic of Moldova has proved to be unable to follow the example of the Baltic States, which managed to avoid scenarios such as that conducted in Transnistria, in turn they joined NATO (2004) and the EU. The Republic of Moldova, by contrast, joined the CIS in December 1991 (with a note that it is not participating in military activities) and, by adopting the new Constitution in 1994, proclaimed itself as a neutral state, which prohibits the presence of foreign troops. Following this behavior, the Republic of Moldova, mainly, stood alone to face the full spectrum of threats to its national security, and without any resources to contribute to the regional security.

**The impact of EU enlargement**

The situation began to change when Romania had a safe EU accession perspective, and the EU has realized that in the immediate Eastern neighbourhood there is Moldova, which is not controlling about 12% of its national territory and 452 km of Moldova-Ukraine border; on this territory Russian troops and paramilitary units of anti-regime from Transnistria are illegally placed, created and equipped with arms and ammunition by the Russian Federation. However, the existing problem of the Transnistrian conflict cannot change the fact that the Russian Federation is a very important player for the EU, NATO, and many countries-members of these international organizations.

It is enough to note the importance of Russia as a supplier of natural gas, and the importance of the possibility to transit some types of goods through the Russian territory to NATO troops in Afghanistan. However, the conclusion is that in 2003 the EU has abandoned the principle of non-interference in the issue of the Transnistrian conflict. So, on 27 February 2003, the EU and USA have imposed a travel ban on their territory for a group of representatives from the Tiraspol administration. This step was taken after the Kremlin administration said it could not honour its commitments to evacuate troops from the Republic of Moldova due to the fact that the administration of Transnistria does not allow it.

In 2004 the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched, and its aim was to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe after the wave of new members in 2004. As a result, in 2005 the EU involvement became more active. At the beginning of the year EU-Ukraine and EU-Moldova Action Plans were signed. Actions coordinated in the “triangle” Brussels-Kiev-Chisinau were laid in both Plans, with regard to increasing the attention to the situation at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border.

The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) started to function on March 3, 2006. This action, not carried out in the official format of negotiations, changed the situation on the Transnistria issue significantly – the Transnistrian economic agents had to register with the State Registration Chamber of the Republic of Moldova and to carry out export operations based on the documents issued by
the respective organizations of the Republic of Moldova. Thus, these businesses are presented abroad as Moldovan economic agents.

On September 26-27, 2006, “5-sided” consultations were held in Odessa, after which it has been decided that the EU and the U.S. obtained the status of “observers” in the negotiation process (the “5+2” format). This modification of negotiations’ format did not change anything in terms of quality, because the “pentagonal/5-sided” negotiation process is actually a trap for the Republic of Moldova, set up by the Russian Federation when signing the Memorandum regarding the normalization of relations between Moldova and Transnistria on May 8, 1997. This negotiations’ format wrongly assumes that the phenomenon known as “the Transnistrian conflict” is an internal conflict between the population from the right and the left bank of the Dniester River.

Accordingly, Igor Smirnov – a Russian citizen, who is the head of the authoritarian regime, established in the Eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova as a result of the military aggression of the Russian Federation in 1992, – is “part” of the conflict in this “pentagonal” format. Russia’s official position states that the political solution to the conflict should be achieved solely through the dialogue between the authorities from Chisinau and Tiraspol, in which both “sides” have absolutely equal rights. In addition, the Tiraspol regime representatives refuse to recognize the “5+2” negotiations’ format at all, calling it a “permanent political deliberation.” This discrepancy between the essence of the conflict and the negotiation format reduces to null any prospect to achieve any progress in the “5+2” format. This means that introducing the EU in this sterile format of the negotiation process does not increase the EU’s role in conflict resolution.

The following conclusion can be taken from the mentioned overlapping factors: the EU gradually increases its involvement in resolving issues related to regional security. However, before assessing the new opportunities aroused from the launch of the Eastern Partnership Initiative, an assessment of threats to national security of the Republic of Moldova, and confronting it with the opportunities offered by EU policy, is required.

The list of threats to the national security of the Republic of Moldova is long – starting from excessive dependence on a single market for the goods made in Moldova, and to the energy security issue, and so on. This state of affairs is due to a number of both internal and external factors.

Internal Factors

The Republic of Moldova is the legal successor of the Moldavian SSR, as a result of Soviet republics created on August 2, 1940 by the decision of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow. The decision to create the Moldavian SSR was taken after the Soviet Union had taken control of Bessarabia on 28 June 1940, which was part of the Romanian state starting from 1918. For half a century (1940-1990) the Union Center promoted
a policy of strengthening the control over the Moldavian SSR territory. This goal was achieved primarily by applying the following policies:

- Physical extermination of “alien social elements”, that appeared on the territory of Bessarabia while being part of Romania (intellectuals, representatives of clergy, public officials and activists of various “bourgeois” parties, etc.)
- Repeated deportations in the period of 1941-1949 and the forced collectivization of agriculture;
- Artificial famine in the years of 1946-1947, after which at least 150 000 people have been killed;
- Abolition of historical memory, national culture and the forced russification of the local population;
- Bringing massive population from the rest of the USSR.

Following this policy, when the USSR collapsed, there was no dominant intention of transforming the Moldavian SSR territory, i.e. the former soviet republic, into an independent state. Also, there was no precedent and no tradition of statehood in the collective memory of the population, which would be linked to the territory of Moldavian SSR. Instead, the public opinion was polarized by two impractical options. First one was to unite with Romania, similarly to the event in 1918. The other one was to maintain the USSR at any price. This mindset, combined with lack of democracy traditions and a extremely low political culture, affected the transformation of the Moldavian SSR in an independent state very negatively.

After the collapse of the USSR in August 1991, parliamentary and presidential elections have periodically been conducted in the Republic of Moldova, which were considered by foreign observers as free and fair. However, the results of these elections have proved that Moldovan society is not able to choose governance that has a certain level of competence and political ambition to adequately address national security threats. No government, formed after these free and fair elections, was able to undertake concrete actions towards ensuring the country's energy security and diversification of markets for Moldovan goods. Even worse is that no government has been able to develop a national strategy for reunification of the status, also by achieving the unconditional discharge of the military troops of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Moldova.

Sociological surveys, conducted over several years, demonstrate unequivocally that the Moldovan society became indifferent to illegal presence of the foreign military on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, and to the fact that an unconstitutional regime exists in Transnistria. Moreover, after the elections, the political parties that enter the Parliament declare themselves as being pro-Russian. Accordingly, such topics such as evacuation of Russian troops, etc. are completely absent on the electoral agenda of these parties.

For this reason, not a single government coalition in Moldova had a coherent and consistent policy on issues concerning national security in the period of 1990-
2010. Also, the issue of debts accumulated by the Transnistrian regime for the used Russian gas is missing from the public agenda. In the mid-2010, this debt has exceeded the amount of 2.5 billion U.S. dollars, at the time when “GAZPROM” tries to claim these fabulous sums from “MOLDOVA-GAZ” through the International Arbitration Court in Moscow.

Therefore, this situation represents a serious threat to the national security of the Republic of Moldova. The absence of a clear-cut and consistent position of all the governments of the Republic of Moldova until now, with regard to this matter, can be explained both by lack of political will, and by corruption.

The External Factor

From the very beginning, the process of building-up the Republic of Moldova state was affected by the policy promoted by the central union, who wanted to keep Moldova in the USSR at all costs. It is for this purpose, the emergence of two republics “as part of the USSR” has occurred on Moldovan territory, after the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted on June 23, 1990 the Declaration of Sovereignty. On August 19, 1990, “the Gagauz Soviet Socialist Republic as part of USSR” was proclaimed in Comrat (a town in Southern part of the Republic of Moldova); and on September 2, on the same year, “the Moldovan Transnistrian Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the USSR” was proclaimed in Tiraspol.

After the dissolution of the USSR, Moldova’s policy of blackmail through the unresolved conflict in the Eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova has been taken over by the Russian Federation. On April 2, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree no. 320 that the military units of the former 14th Army, located on the left bank of Dniester River, were subordinated to Russia. The Russian Federation has crucially contributed to the creation of “the Transnistrian army”, delegating staff officers for this purpose, and providing it with arms and ammunition. Thanks to this support from Russia, the anti-constitutional regime succeeded to destroy through violence the fragile state structures of the Republic of Moldova in Transnistria. In 1992, the Russian Federation has committed an act of military aggression against the Republic of Moldova, ensuring the survival of the anti-constitutional regime in Transnistria.

Currently the “Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (“TMR”) exists only thanks to the political, military and economic support from Russia. During time, the public and private capital from Russia has illegally privatized strategic economic organizations on the left bank of Dniester, the local banking system has access to the outside through the banking system of Russia; Transnistria’s debt for the used gas has exceeded 2.5 billion U.S. dollars, etc. Moreover, the main thing is that the Russian Federation does not recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, maintaining the illegal presence of troops and ammunition depots on the territory of the Republic of Moldova (in Transnistria).
The Republic of Moldova – EU – the new opportunities

Following parliamentary elections on July 29, 2009 creation of a ruling coalition became possible, the “Alliance for European Integration” (AEI), made up of four political parties (53 seats in the Parliament out of 101). This coalition was able to choose the leaders of the Parliament and to form a government. However, the AEI activity was affected by the fact that attempts to elect the president have failed, which meant that there will be new elections in 2010. However, the creation of this coalition has radically changed the relations between Moldova and the EU. Change of Government in Chisinau has occurred shortly after the Eastern Partnership was launched in Prague on May 7, 2009.

After forming the government, a very intense and open dialogue, related to specific projects, between the EU and Moldova began. This increase of internal reform process, based upon EU standards, opened the perspective to strengthen the democratic rule of law. For the first time, a real chance to achieve liberalization of visa regime for Moldovan citizens has occurred. The important thing is that, if this regime starts working, this fact will suddenly increase the prestige of the Republic of Moldova citizenship for residents of Transnistria, and the Republic of Moldova will get a strong psychological advantage against the authoritarian regime in Transnistria.

Following an open dialogue between Moldova and the EU, the issue of the Transnistrian conflict has been included on the agenda of EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine dialogue. Although this dialogue does not promise quick solutions (the Russian Federation maintains its tough position), the Republic of Moldova has gained fundamentally new opportunities to strengthen its positions in relation to the anti-constitutional regime in Transnistria. The EU together with the Government promotes the policy to consolidate the confidence and to restore relations between the people on both banks of the river, despite the resistance of the Tiraspol regime.

On December 18, 2009, Moldova has been accepted as a contracting state to the Energy Community Treaty. This step opens the perspective for the Republic of Moldova to integrate in the regional energy market and ensure energy security in this way.

Therefore, the conclusion is that the EU – the Republic of Moldova Partnership has created the foundations to strengthen the statehood of the Republic of Moldova as a democratic constitutional state, whose existence will not be questioned both inside and outside. Moreover, the EU has become a major player regarding the evacuation of the Russian military potential from the Republic of Moldova, and the recovery/restoration of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. The effectiveness of this policy will depend on the depth of the EU – Ukraine dialogue.

The Analysis of the Eastern Partnership policy shows that the decisive parameter which determines its effectiveness is the level of democracy and political will of the countries included in this program. Thus, it means that only the citizens of the Republic of Moldova have power over the future development of the statehood of
the Republic of Moldova. Certainly, only the prospect, albeit remote, of European integration is one that strengthens and mobilizes the Moldovan society. As further development of the Republic of Moldova statehood can be successful only through the consistent implementation of European standards and values.
After the fall of the Soviet regime, the process of adopting various reforms in the security field began, but at a slower pace. It is obvious that the first steps have been taken to dismantle the former bodies of security services in several agencies, and subsequently appropriate laws to ensure civil society’s control over state security organs had been implemented[1]. The adopted legislative changes were promising, but the most important changes had been virtually neglected. In comparison with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries legislation, the legal framework of the Republic of Moldova is one of the most advanced and connected to European values. The existing state security bodies in the Republic of Moldova are characterized by a high level of fragmentation. This fragmentation is the result of the need to destroy the former security services after the fall of the Soviet Union.

As a result, the system of state security bodies doubles some of its objectives and activities currently, and encourages the presence of rivalry between various agencies for power of influence and resources, resulting in an inefficient communication, cooperation, collaboration and coordination between them[2]. Returning to the history of the KGB in the 1990s, it was not actually broken, but was reorganized. During the Soviet regime, all of the security services were part of the one single entity, which included, along with its coercive functions, repressive investigation, isolation and detention and Customs Service, Guard and Protection Service and other, but also services to the state security organs to grant priorities in their base function – the informative one, for connecting to the international community’s demands. An information service may not have detention, enforcement activities, but just the informative function, with the right to inform empowered courts that hold the power of decision. The reorganization took place later. The staff of multiple organs and public institutions has been affected, which is why many people with high professional training have retired. At that time an acute lack of professional staff was experienced, and this continues even today. In order to train the new contingent, special trainings and vast experience are required, all of these being obtained during a long time frame. The process of attracting and training qualified specialists takes a while. Vocational training is conditional upon the existence of special schools.

In this context, the concept of national security has a particular significance. Currently, the new concept of national security has not been adopted yet. The main
vector in developing policy to ensure national security is the concept approved on May 5, 1995 by the Moldovan Parliament. Also, on May 8, 2008, the Parliament voted the draft of a new national security concept in first reading[3]. The basic principle of this concept is the status of permanent neutrality of the Republic of Moldova, a provision that emphasizes that Moldova is not part of and will not enter into military blocs, it will not participate in military actions and will not allow the presence of military troops and foreign weapons on its territory. At the same time, the concept provides clearly Moldova’s national security objectives, namely to secure and defend the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order, democratic development, internal security and statehood of the Republic of Moldova.

The draft of the new National Security Concept of the Republic of Moldova was prepared by the Committee established by Presidential Decree no. 374-IV of December 22, 2005, and is the political document that: reflects the overall assessment of the security environment at the national and international level where Moldova is operating; defines the objective of government policy and guidelines on national security, human values and principles that are generally to be promoted and protected by state, and reinforces irreversibility of the country’s European integration direction. The necessity for a new Concept adoption is caused by dynamic changes that have occurred nationally, regionally and internationally in the field of state security and the legal effects depletion of the National Security Concept, approved by the Parliament Decision no. 445-XIII of May 15, 1995. In spite of its legally balanced character, the Concept of 1995 cannot ensure effective implementation in practice of a number of constitutional provisions, against the backdrop of new risks and security challenges, including international terrorism.

Therefore, there was the need to draft this National Security Concept project, that starts from the multidimensional character of national security, of Moldova’s national interests, foreign policy and security objectives, of the state complexity of risks, threats and dangers to national security, placing people – citizens and human rights at the heart of national security objectives, the establishment and launch of national security strategic planning capacities, the development of the civilian component of the security sector, strengthening civilian control over armed forces and power institutions, as well as improving operational capabilities of the armed forces and power institutions. The project meets the international rigors and clearly establishes the status of Moldova’s constitutional neutrality. In preparing the document, the experience of several countries (Baltic States, Hungary, Georgia, Poland, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic), security concepts and conceptual visions of some neutral countries (Finland, Austria, Sweden), and studies of specialized research centers in the United Kingdom, USA, Canada were taken into account. It can also be mentioned that the current concept is more advanced than the previous one, and it considers the following objects to secure: human and individual, society, and citizens’ security i.e. societal security, not just the state, as was stated in the previous
design. The following content is missing from the Concept: components and mechanisms of protection, provisions for this item include the resources or the progressivity to protect the human factor.

The fact is that the concept is launching a political message expected by the European Union and the Western partners from Moldova, and confirms the irreversibility of our country’s transformation in a state of law, democratic, European. Adoption of the new Concept is also an objective set by the Individual Partnership Action Plan Republic of Moldova – NATO (objective 2.1.1, implicit 1.1.3 and 1.5.1;) which aims to improve the political and legal base of the Republic of Moldova’s national defense and security systems, necessary for proper reform of this sector[4].

According to article 13 of the Law on state security organs, the system of state security bodies consists of the Information and Security Service, State Protection and Guard Service, Border Guard and Customs Service, which operate in accordance with those laws. Along with the bodies listed in that law, there are other institutions in the Republic of Moldova, which have responsibilities on this subject under special laws, including: Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Department of Penitentiary Institutions of the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Information Technology and Communications, Civil Protection and Emergency Situations Service, General Prosecutor, Center for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption etc.

Thus, the presence of a whole range of authorities responsible for national security imposes coordination of their activities to prevent and counteract possible internal and external threats.

In the draft of the Concept the international cooperation is seen as a tool to ensure and strengthen the national security of the Republic of Moldova. The stability, predictability, and continuity of the fundamental positions of the Moldovan foreign policy are some preconditions, which would allow Moldova to become a democratic European state with an advanced economy and a high level of security. After adoption of this document in the second reading, the Republic of Moldova will develop and approve the national security strategy.

It is also necessary to note that one of the inadequacies of this document is playing too loose with national security threats: direct aggression; local or regional conflicts; import and sale of illegal weapons, items with increased danger of radiological, chemical or bacteriological contamination; damage of economic potential, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration etc.

Probably one of the most important forms of cooperation is elaboration of legislative acts by representatives of state security bodies in collaboration with specialized institutions, because these actions are carried out through executive tasks in two or more areas of the government. Horizontal connection is reflected through some organizational measures taken by state security bodies under mutual agreement with representatives of central bodies.

In this context, the following issue, which is still under consideration by the legislative bodies of the Republic of Moldova, should be specified: the implementation of
anti-terrorism legislation in line with international standards. From this perspective, it is important to associate terrorism, within Moldovan legislation, with a number of crimes against the security of humans and the world, and all legal consequences emerged here, including non-use of the limitation period, which is important in conditions where terrorism has become global and the number of victims of terrorist attacks is so tremendous. Nowadays, this is particularly important, when we find behind the terrorism the military aggression of some countries against others, hiding under the veil the real subjects of this kind of aggression. In such cases, the charges fall on the social organizations of religious or other extremist connotation, although leaders of these organizations are instructed by Intelligence services of different countries and are also controlled by them. It is important to make a clear difference between terrorism and quasi-terrorism, behind which we find other more dangerous crimes against humanity and the whole world.

Fighting terrorism, the main direction being its prevention, should be started at an early stage, but terrorist situations mentioned in the legislation should be reviewed in a broader space and time, rather than individual cases of contamination, explosion of buildings and constructions, hostage taking, etc. From this perspective, the criminal expertise of socio-economic transformational projects and different normative legal acts is of major importance. This could help us avoid situations that could lead to the development of terrorism or other criminal means to solve the problems.

In such situations international cooperation has a great importance. This cooperation must be based on the development of specific documents and actions by highly experienced professionals[5]. Addressing the issue of combating terrorism in order to respect human rights, and especially the right to life, is one of the most problematic situations which are very stringent today. In the case of terrorism, all individuals have the right to live: the terrorists and their victims, and participants in counter-terrorist operation. It is permissible to limit rights and legal interests of terrorists to ensure the rights and legal interests of their victims. Article 3 of the Law «on Combating Terrorism» states that the counter-terrorist operation is focused on ensuring human rights and minimize loss of human lives[6].

Taking into account the social and political situation of the Republic of Moldova and the global changes taking place in the world, we can certainly talk about a clear threat of terrorism and its evolution. Processes taking place in the world show that there is intensification and an increase in relations and mergers of terrorist organizations and organized crime groups. Plans, goals and methods of joint action are clearer in areas such as: weapons trade, munitions and explosives trade, drugs trade, illegal migration and money laundering.

Without the creation of an effective legal basis in the fight against terrorism and organized crime in general, there is no way to ensure stability and irreversibility of the outcome. Together with the special resolution of the Government, the order of social rehabilitation of people who have suffered from terrorist acts was established[7].
It is worth mentioning that the future existence of Intelligence services is not about technology itself. Now everything depends on the knowledge and process in which we plan, organize, handle and train in order to create that effective information value and analytical support for the national decision-making process.

One of the major priorities of the legislative bodies from the Republic of Moldova is adjusting anti-terrorist legislation to international standards.

In the Moldovan legislation, terrorism is matched with a series of crimes against the security of the world with all legal consequences arising from this, including non-use of the limitation period, which is important in conditions where terrorism has acquired an international character, and the number victims of terrorist attacks is so great. And this is particularly important nowadays, when we find behind the terrorism the military aggression of some countries against others, hiding the real subjects of this kind of aggression. In such cases, the allegations are made against religious or other extremist social organizations, although the leaders of these organizations are prepared by Intelligence services of different countries, and are also controlled by them[8].

A new democratic state, where the challenging role of Intelligence service’s reform is highlighted: the lack of awareness and application of democracy, limited time for the establishment of mature democratic institutions, lack of financial and human resources necessary to carry out reforms; implementation of policy for multiple objectives within the Security reforms (democratization and combating new terrorist threats) and the twofold objective to achieve and maintain the effectiveness and democratization of the security services; and finally «washing» off the security officers who were involved in the former regime, which creates personal problems[9].

The challenge for the future of Moldova is to create a proper mentality of the social and political actors, which will help to expedite the implementation of a truly democratic political culture. This will allow accomplishing a genuine security sector reform in accordance with the rules and principles of the European Union[10]. Mistakes made in the initial phase of democratic reforms have decreased capacities of law enforcement agencies and state regulation and monitoring, thus diminishing the role of the state and causing decrease of its effectiveness in resolving security issues. Development of increasing transparency, along with the best practices of countries with lasting democratic traditions, can truly contribute to the democratization of the sector.[11]

The goal of information Intelligence services is the annihilation and deprivation of international terrorist groups’ funding. Sources of terrorist groups’ financing represent the first target for Intelligence services in tracking down and annihilating them. Efficient terrorist acts (from the magnitude point of view) can be committed only with large sums of money. So the first objective to discover, identify and annihilate terrorist financing is of paramount importance.

At present, state security bodies from Moldova can hardly be a security community in the true sense of the concept described by the British student Zara Steiner:
«a harmonious cooperation between agencies and government control» which tends to «eradicate enmity [between different Intelligence services] and establish friendly and productive relationship.»[12] Whatever the level of cooperation achieved, it is held horizontally.

Further problems could arise being caused by institutional and cultural peculiarities. For example, there is the overlap between law enforcement bodies and Intelligence services («the Rules for the collection of information security should not be confused with those applied in the process of collecting information for law enforcement purposes»)[13]. While Intelligence activity is focused specifically on prevention, law enforcement bodies aim towards reaction. Their mandate is more difficult due to an even greater contextual dilemma - the freedom and security.

At the same time, it is worth mentioning the good side of things, regarding the fact that national security is achieved not only through the efforts of the Information and Security Service. There is a joint contribution of all power structures and institutions, as mentioned before. This aim can and is achieved only within a well-balanced mechanism of cooperation between all state institutions and structures. Thus, Information and Security Service is able to retaliate against the risks and threats faced by the Moldovan state. For this purpose, Information and Security Service managed to ensure effective collaboration with colleagues from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Center for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption, General Prosecutor, Ministry of Defense, so as to be able to react promptly and without delay when necessary. Joint meetings often occur at different levels, action plans in various fields are developed and implemented; joint operations are carried out. As a result of these activities, the effectiveness of state security bodies increases. Some of the latest Information and Security Service operations are jointly developed and implemented[14].

Taking into account the fact that the media and academia involved in studying Intelligence service’ reforms are in quite limited number, authorities that make the expertise of the relevant laws are even less.

Lack of research on preventing and combating terrorism, possibly entail a poor experience in the field, and therefore, the deficiency to identify and implement appropriate solutions in individual cases exists. The situation requires increase of practical and scientific research in this field, by using advanced experience of specialists for creation of technical and scientific basis to prevent and combat acts of terrorism.

As mentioned before, there are several public authorities with responsibilities in national security in the Republic of Moldova, each one featuring a strictly established competence and structure by the legislation. An effective interaction in this area would contribute significantly to solving major national security problems. The information is exchanged ineffectively between the structures within the national security sector at national, regional and international levels. The problem persists not only in Moldova but also in other countries, where duties on national security is spread among a number of ministries, institutions and departments. Thus, dispersal
of staff responsible for implementing national security leads to extremely irrational use, adversely affecting quality of the work. Drafting legislative acts directly with the participation of state security representatives in collaboration with specialized institutions represents, probably, one of the most important forms of cooperation, because duties of the executive power in two or more branches of public administration are carried out through these actions. Horizontal connection is reflected in some organizational measures taken by state security bodies, in mutual agreement with representatives of central bodies[15].

Moldova’s state security bodies have the legal right to cooperate internationally. This aspect is very relevant, because in order to fulfill the country’s future European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, it creates a powerful stimulus in the Moldovan state security bodies’ adjustment process to democratic values and norms within the European Union and Euro-Atlantic community.

Within the context of actions taken regarding European integration, management of Information and Security Service conducted a series of visits to Brussels, where they met with executives from the European Commission Security Directorate and the Security Office of the Secretary General of EU Council, and the first official contacts with the European security structures. Information and Security Service participates in the multilateral annual meetings of foreign Intelligence services Heads of neighboring countries. During these meetings, issues related to cooperation, collaboration and the need for progress in European, regional and national security are discussed.

Cooperation between Information and Security Service and Intelligence services of EU countries aims towards adoption and implementation of active, proactive measures, designed to streamline and boost counter-terrorism operations nationally and internationally, to discourage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to settle other risks to national and community security.

Cooperation between the military structures, parliamentary bodies, the law and Intelligence structures are of primary importance in the process of carrying out conclusive counter-terrorism measures. Foreign Intelligence services are often sources of important information, which can be used to counteract the terrorism threat within the country.

Unlike most EU member countries, Russia and Central Asian countries address terrorism as a threat to national security. Both at the Collective Security Treaty Organization (which was signed in Bishkek, October 11, 2000) and at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which was held in Tashkent in 2001) anti-terrorist centers were created. Terrorist groups, actively supported Al-Qaeda, are currently operating in this region. Proceeding from the facts mentioned above, these states must develop new types of cooperation both at national and regional levels, and at the international level as well, in order to address threats of transnational terrorism in the region.

EU enlargement towards East raises many questions to countries that show their intention or desire to be included in this structure in the future; this also determines
the European Union to focus attention on the lack of democracy in Belarus, or the failed democracies such as the cases of the Republic of Moldova or Ukraine. It is indisputable that poor state administration or lack of democracy is one of the sources of terrorism. Poor domestic and foreign policies of both small and big countries, is another source of terrorism. We are in a timeframe when international terrorism has reached such a level that it is able to manipulate the policy of many countries and also to dissolve governments.

Due to the large number of features that characterize any democracy in its unique context, there is no universal solution to control the security process at the moment. However, some features are considered essential in any discussion on security reforms within a democracy. We can use a dialectic style to discuss the balance between such values as: freedom vs. security vs. transparency vs. concealment, vs. centralization vs. community safety fragmentation, and legislative control vs. executive control over security.

In this context, the issue of national security considers, primarily, to ensure the implementation of international democratic standards. It is worth mentioning that the future existence of Intelligence services is not about technology itself. Today, it is about the knowledge and how we plan to organize, manage and train with regards to the effective information and analysis process at national level and to the decision-making process. This requires a rather qualitative approach by the political elite. Thus, the strategic Intelligence community must receive authority and autonomy to carry out its responsibilities freely, when artificial obstacles imposed by bureaucratic rules are created.

The war against terrorism will be a long conflict, where the front lines are not marked and the practitioners of terrorism have intentionally diminished the difference between combatants and non-combatants. Terrorism is more than a bomb or a weapon, it is a battle that uses the political arena; it is a war of ideas and ideologies. Combating terrorism requires determination, courage, imagination and skill.

From the above-mentioned, we can conclude that the priority tasks of our society in its fight against terrorism must be:

1. The Policy of double standards leads to “boomerang effect”. It is time to answer the question «QUO VADIS»?
2. The fight against international terrorism is impossible without a democratic society characterized by respect for human rights and human values accepted everywhere.
3. Creating effective special international forces; a database, and communication channels to prevent terrorist threats.
4. Accelerating the development of a unique anti-terrorism legislation; improving the efficiency of the legislative and investigative bodies’ cooperation system, including the interaction during the development and practical implementation of special specific operations.
5. Implementing a system to analyze common security threats within terrorism in several countries and regions.

6. Developing a mutual solidarity, based on inter-departmental powerful international links, which would benefit most of all, from regional cooperation for international security.

7. Anticipation and prevention of conflicts is the strategic goal of foreign policy and general security of the European Union[18].

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7. Republic of Moldova Government Decision on approval of the implementation of social rehabilitation of people who have suffered from a terrorist act no. 873 of 08.07.2002, ”Monitorul Oficial” of the Republic of Moldova no. 103-105 / 997 of 18.07.2002


18. The Article “Terrorism and the organized crime”, Materials from the International Criminality Symposium 24-25 September, Criminality at the beginning of the third millennium: findings, trends, perspectives.– Chisinau, 2005
It’s a good privilege for me to address this select gathering to discuss the IPAP as an opportunity for enhancing the national security.

I would start by arguing that the IPAP represents a value-sharing tool helping the beneficiaries to build their values back home. At the same time, it is a genuine communication channel between NATO and the Government of the Republic of Moldova. With that we can use the opportunity to make the world to know about Moldova in all of its security aspects. Being part of the IPAP, once again proves the pro-European security identity, consequently, helping to develop domestically a viable security framework. And, all of this could be found in the National Security Concept of 2008. Moreover, the IPAP had been translated into the Executive’s Program 2009–2013 with regard to becoming a security provider by actively participating to European Security and Defense Policy.

In forwarding this idea to you I couldn’t avoid mentioning the situation that existed before the IPAP. Thus, there was an old security precept singling the Ministry of Defense as the muster authority reckoning with defense issues. Nonetheless, cooperation with NATO was focused at the lower level, encompassing tactical interoperability mainly. The Individual Partnership Program and the Partnership Assessment and Review Program were not sufficient for the sustainability of the defense reforms programs. And, there was lacking of interest among defense community to go further.

But the situation had changed, and Moldova realized that it can’t stay apart of the game anymore, taking into consideration that the world had brought new challenges. Moreover, the security paradigm and social context of the world became marked by cooperation and interchangeability. Therefore, only staying together Moldova can win over its own security difficulties. The end-state is to achieve an increased level of trust and confidence among its partners.

Now I will explore a little bit why we see the IPAP as an opportunity. Firstly, it helps to maintain Moldova within the democratic community orbit. Secondly, in developing its connections Moldova had gotten the needed contributions from its counterparts, in particular, when it was the case of strategic papers development.
Thirdly, the IPAP had played a significant role in changing the typical mindset among the defense community. Fourthly, it had extended the circle of examining defense issues by going far beyond the limits of the MoD and last but not least, it had intensified its bilateral negotiations.

In proving that IPAP is an opportunity, I will use some of its practical approaches, especially training and education programs, or personnel recruitment and management, which helped Moldova to learn out what, would be the requirements of establishing a democratic control mechanism over its armed forces.

This was achieved by expanding the circle of key players involved in security issues, by intensifying the dialog with civil society and by attracting the youth in discussing defense and security challenges.

Now let’s see what makes IPAP so a reliable mechanism. I will begin with pointing out its cyclical approach that permits a revision of the objectives and to streamline a balance between the security demands and the resources available. Then, it goes with recommendations of what incremental improvements would be needed for heading rightly toward the security system building. Aside of that are multilateral consultations held either at NAC or PASP levels, where first hand expertise could be shared.

I will use a practical example from the defense planning area, to illustrate how the system works. At least for now, we must consider a broad list of contingencies and found those most applicable to the Republic of Moldova. To do that, we would have to perform an analysis and an inventory of what the current defense structures can perform. So, we will come up with acquiring those capabilities and drafting strategies that would be best suitable to face our own challenges. At the same time we ought to consider what would be the combination between resources and real possibilities. In the end, the system must provide us with predictable solutions helping to span the issue among politicians.

In conclusion I would reiterate that the IPAP represents a unique opportunity for upgrading the domestic security system, because of its provenience from a democratic political conjuncture. And because of its expandability, the assistance could be designed to tackle the particular needs of a certain Partner. It is really a working mechanism that allows to measure the progress and to adjust programs. If, all of its goals would be achieved, then the European future of Moldova seems inevitable. Finally, it is the backbone of NATO-Moldova future cooperation efforts to develop the national security system.
The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War era. It was a period that has induced not a very happy experience for Eastern Europe in particular and the entire humanity in general, and, of course, the event will have a special symbolic significance for the entire German and world history. The problem to be addressed relates to the need for proper management policies of the Soviet legacy of the past and present interpretation of past events, and the importance of such discussions is highlighted by the current controversy in some societies on the legacy of the totalitarian communist past and the objective attitude towards this problem.

Why is the history so important to post-communist societies, or why should it be important? The history of every nation is a part of national heritage. It is the History which offers lessons that are crucial for the formation of political culture, but also offers lessons to reproduce the negative side of the national history. Deep knowledge of history, understanding of optimal periods that are the “dark periods” of history from the perspective of national liberal democratic values are of paramount importance. Particularly, the history plays a cardinal role in the formation of national identity, legitimacy of the political regime and establishing the fundamental values of the society. During the communist regime, historical research has been limited both by the methodological approach (the Marxist Leninist approach) and by the official wording of scientific matters and then checking of the results (the Five-Year Strategy and censorship imposed on scientific research results). In this respect, many experts consider that the first task of the historians in the post-communist countries, immediately after the collapse of communist regimes, was to analyze the phenomenon of communism in its entirety and put it under profound analysis. However, the literature draws attention to the fact that it requires an interdisciplinary approach to the communist past heritage along with the participation of experts from different fields.

The mission of a correct policy of memory towards the communist past is in no way the retaliation against any particular person involved in this phenomenon. The main objective of such a policy would be to draw a clear and safe line between the totalitarian communist legacy and initiation of a new development stage of the society; a line that would induce a new era of legitimacy and morality of the political class, which would allow creating a national consensus on the future of the country and the essence of the national interest. In this respect, the most popular procedure
experienced by post-communist societies, to induce such legitimacy and to draw such a symbolic line between the communist abusive past and the new society, was the lustration or de-communization procedure, a procedure that is inherent to democratic development and to ensuring normality in the post-communist societies. In such a context, issues concerning the essence of the lustration procedure and its role designed to ensure the normality and the successful transition to democracy are crucial for a fair policy of managing the consequences of the former Soviet system.

Thus, according to some authors, lustration would be “the exclusion of individuals from the political life of the society or even put them under liability for unlawful acts committed during the former totalitarian regime.” Another author, N. Letki, believes that lustration can be regarded as a procedure for screening persons in order to choose the public position and degree of their involvement in the Communist regime[1]. In this respect, N. Letki considers lustration as a procedure intrinsically necessary for the successful transition to democracy, and ignoring that may lead to the failure of such transition. It is also necessary to note that the author uses the term “lustration” in the absolutely same sense as the term “de-communization”, i.e. procedures or processes without which the factual change in such societies cannot take place. However, adoption of laws on lustration was the most common practice to conduct de-communization and induction of normality in post-communist societies.

Although the importance of such a procedure as “lustration” has been recognized to ensure avoidance of potential problems related to the transition process towards democracy, however, this procedure still has some contradictions which might affect its rationality. For most Eastern European countries lustration was regarded as a procedure through which conditions for an easier transition to the form of a “democratic, stable society” tended to be created; a procedure to establish a legitimacy that is inherent to the democratic political system. Most authors, who have examined issues related to the lustration procedure, stressed that “the main objective of this procedure is to demonstrate the discontinuity and change of the paradigm of government practices. But the implementation in practice of such procedure still does not free us from some barriers to its implementation.”[2] In this respect, one of the first problems related to the lustration law enforcement refers to the problem of lustration law implementation and its retroactive application, thereby breaking a principle that is quite widespread in practice – the non-retroactivity of the law. In ex-communist countries’ experience a general rule has been constituted, that when the most part of irregularities or actions incriminated by the lustration law were committed, at the time of the offending actions, those actions did not contravene the law. In this sense, the question of major interest for environmental experts, who discussed the issue on lustration procedures, referred to the problems of laws in retroaction and risks of such a fact.

Another difficulty, related to the implementation of lustration, refers to the integrity and demonstration of the causality link between the committed action and the
serious criminal consequences that have occurred. The rule of highlighting the link
between the committed action and the incriminated illegality is a highly important
aspect of the contemporary law, or the generally applied rule is actore non probante
reuse absolvitur[3]. However, under such aspect, cases when the incrimination was
particularly burdened by lack of evidence have been known in ex-communist Euro-
pean countries; and the destruction of former security services’ archives have been a
widely known experience in the former Soviet Union.

Transition to democracy represents a stage in the development of societies,
where, in addition to profound systemic transformations, traditional games related
to the struggle for power between different political groups can be distinguished. In
such a context, there are big chances that the lustration procedures, which are meant
to lead to increasing political legitimacy of the elites and facilitating the promoted
reforms, will be used as weapons against political opponents, which will certainly
complicate the promotion of reforms very much. Moreover, experience of several
countries of Central and Eastern Europe are clear examples of the possibility of such
development of situations, an issue which draws our attention to the fact that lus-
tration is not meant to be a mere political weapon, as the procedure has a broader
and more important target. In this regard, the Council of Europe legal practice and
recommendations made during the nineties have clearly pointed out that the ap-
plication of such procedures should not in any way lead to the breach of some other
rights provided for in the regulations adopted by this organization.

A no less important issue related to the application of lustration refers to its orga-
nizational and procedural barriers. In this respect, the main aspect of the lustration
refers to the problem of those who are carrying out the lustration, highlighting the
need to lustrate the lustrators, or the need to find the answer to the question of con-
trol over those who perform the lustration procedure, in terms of a society deeply
marked by communism.

Lustration procedures are based on conscious interpretation of the fact that com-
munism – as an ideology, a political system and an era of development of a part of
the humanity – has marked a deeply turbulent period, has induced profound and
negative social and political consequences for those societies that have experienced
the given phenomenon. The attitude of the societies towards the phenomenon of
Soviet communism was different and was manifested with different intensity from
one case to another. However, in all cases the condemnation of communism and its
crimes has constituted a way of legitimizing the new democracies. Formally all the
ex-communist regimes have condemned the totalitarian regimes and the past, but
the actual policy pursued by them vary from case to case, which is determined by
an extended complex of reasons, where both objective and mostly subjective factors
are involved.

Despite the small differences that communist regimes have known in different
countries, these have some common features that constitute the matrix of commu-
nist regimes, which are all those features that are not beneficial to any country. In this respect, the most striking features of the communist regimes can be distinguished as follows: single mass party, totalitarian communist ideology, the concentration of power in the hands of one person or group of persons, the lack of separation of powers in the state, lack of a lawful state, and the most outstanding feature of any country – the flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of people.

In addition to the many atrocities committed by communist regimes, such as: – total nationalization of savings and assets, massive disinformation and social manipulation, repressive control in all social spheres – the most eloquent expression of the odious nature of communism is the number of victims of communist regimes. Statistics provided by the Council of Europe in a report presented at the Parliamentary Assembly allows us to emphasize the immensity of Communist atrocities. Thus, the number of victims of communist regimes reported by countries are: USSR – 20 million, China – 65 million, Vietnam – 1 million, North Korea – 2 million, Cambodia – 2 million, Eastern Europe – 1 million, Latin America – 150 thousand; Africa – 1.7 million, Afghanistan – 1.5 million[4], etc. Among the most common crimes included in the report, individual and collective executions, deaths in concentration camps, victims of organized deportations and famine victims, but also a number of others may be mentioned.

In the literature several prominent authors have offered explanations of the reasons and the way in which new democracies have addressed the issue of their past. Huntington made probably the first attempt to address this issue at a scientific level; he was the one who claimed to start from experience of other regions, particularly Eastern European revolutions, trying to find the connection between politics and the way to exit from non-democratic regimes, in particular the role of current elites. According to him, if non-democratic regime leaders were dismissed, then these societies should have a clear desire for punishment / revenge. If the former elite withdrew peacefully from power or they were the ones who have initiated reforms that have reached beyond the original intentions, persecution should fail in these cases. In addition, the author considers that, out of all examples from Eastern European countries, the transitional justice was really monitored only in Germany and Romania, while other states would rather have a policy of forgiveness and forgetting[5].

Another author, John Moran, wrote later that “if the regime did not allow citizens to express discontent or migrate, then we should have expected a more important pressure to initiate lawsuits against former authoritarian leaders, after the occurrence of particular changes. On the contrary, if a country has allowed its citizens certain areas of self-organization, protest or escape, then there should be significantly less desire for revenge.”[6] For these reasons, Moran believes that, given the fact that the Eastern European countries had different policies on issues such as the possibility of escape, tolerance or ease towards their own society and its ability for
self-organization, we should expect different policies and different levels of intensity towards the totalitarian past.

However, the past politics is not the only factor that is able to influence the development of lustration policies. In such a way, according to Welsh “there are a number of factors of the “present policy” able to lead to the implementation of such policies.”[7] Thus, in addition to the results former communist parties have obtained in the first elections and refusing to pursue any reforms, the author mentions the fact that the lustration procedures may be also influenced by interests and political struggles taking place after the collapse of communist regimes, which will certainly affect the efficiency of transitional justice.

In Eastern Europe, concerns about the secret archives, the role of communist officials in carrying out atrocities and the role of secret agents and intelligence officers or any other persons who were involved in dubious and criminal affairs of the communist era, were quite early. Real exit of the region from communism and its first steps towards democracy have been marked by ugly outrageous public debates on the need to discover the truth about the communist regime, debates on discovering the role of communist parties and the secret services to their obedience, to render justice to victims and their surviving families, to identify the evil from angels, and whenever possible, to know and re-establish human rights abused in the past. While these problems were seen as equally important in Prague, Sofia, Budapest and Warsaw, however, the path which should have been pursued was different. Thus, the experience of Eastern European countries has always been different, and the destruction of communist regimes and management of the policy from the past continued this tradition of differentiation.

Table 1. Lustration in Eastern Europe (1989-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of Adoption</th>
<th>Actions taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Spring 1995</td>
<td>The law on genocide and crimes against humanity committed during the Communist regime for Political, Religious, and Ideological reasons. People who had links with the Communist regime (members of polit-bureaus, Central Committees and ministries, members of Supreme Soviets, of Supreme Court and the heads, agents and employees of Sigurimi) may not hold eligible positions in the parliament, government and mass-media.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>January 1998</td>
<td>The Law on checking the moral character of officials and other persons connected with the Defence of State Democracy (The Law on Lustration) Public officials must be “cleaned” by a Special Verification Commission before elections or before being appointed to any eligible positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Legislation</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>The Law on Temporary Introduction of Additional Requirements for Members of</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Executive Institutions of Scientific Organizations and the High Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>for Certification (Panel law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>The Law on Public Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(East)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>March 1994</td>
<td>XXIII Act regarding the check of the Holders of Important Positions, Holders</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of Top Positions in Public Companies and Public Opinion Formers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>March 1997</td>
<td>Lustration Law</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 2006</td>
<td>Supervision of all persons holding public positions on the collaboration with</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the Security Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The 187/1999 Law regarding individual access to the personal File, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>involvement in the activity of Political Security.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Lustration law no. 451/1991 has never been completely implemented.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Judicial Service Act</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Agencies of the Independent Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Have not been created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Committee for Documents Disclosure and Setting the Affiliation with the State Department of Information and Security, created in 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>The Office for Documentation and Investigation of Communist Crimes in the Czech Republic, established in 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>Federal Commissioners for the Files of the State Security Service in the former GDR, founded in 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Office of History, created in 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>The Institute of the National Memory, established in 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>The National Council for Studying the Security Archives, founded in 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>The Institute of the National Memory, established in 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Have not been created</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although most East European states have realized lustration procedures, the achieved results were still different, and this was due to several factors. Thus, in case of the former GDR the lustration procedure was performed in approximately 250,000 cases, usually those concerned are the officials of the state sector, and in-criminations were referring not only to the ties and collaboration with the STASI, but also were applied for such reasons as “technical incompetence”. In the Czech Republic around 15,000 cases of positive lustration took place. In the case of Hungary the lustration was applied to about 600 officials, while in Lithuania the action resulted in the suspension of about 80 key state officials from the office. Bulgaria, although more modest, however, came up with 25 people who have been suspended from office for various reasons. In Albania the lustration procedure was applied to about 200 candidates at the parliamentary elections, and Poland, which experienced a lustration process applied to approximately 20,000 cases, is another example of extensive lustration procedure. Of course, it is very difficult to address the issue of effectiveness of those procedures, but in all cases the societies and the state felt that it is necessary to go through a de-communization procedure based on the lustration procedure. It should also be noted that application of the lustration procedures in Eastern Europe have concluded by taking into account the experience of transitional justice processes in the immediate post-war period in Western European countries, as was the case of the Federative Republic of Germany, France, Italy, etc.

Of course, the measures the states have undertaken at the national level were not the only ones taken to manage a correct policy towards the totalitarian communist past. Moreover, some authors believe that it is absolutely necessary to elaborate an international policy on the subject, this fact generating some high controversy at the
international level. However, despite the fact that the horrors of communist regimes have been condemned by most countries, these atrocities did not go through a process of international condemnation, which would make possible the invocation of the International Criminal Court, and would allow putting liability on those people that have been directly involved in organizing crimes against humanity. One such gap was caused by a variety of factors, many of them resulting from the “strategy of forgetting”, being interpreted as capable of leading to the possibility of reaching a consensus between the different sides of society. However, for many reasons such a policy based on speedy oblivion of communist atrocities proved to be inefficient and involved even some risk, moreover forgetting about the statements of sovietology experts, that “communism should not be forgotten for the simple reason that it involves a constant risk to come back, especially in times of deep crisis of societies”. In such a context, the condemnation of communism has become a necessity in the international arena, which must have upset some important political forces of the European continent, and this is indicative of the timeliness and the need for continuous monitoring of the given situation, in order to prevent revenge of non-democratic and anti-human forces.

The adoption of the Paris Charter for a New Europe on 21 November 1990 by the Heads of CSCE States marked the first step in defining the policy condemning the crimes of communism. They started from the idea that “the era of clashes and division in Europe is outdated, and our continent should free itself from the past heritage, people in the East finally having the opportunity to fulfil their hopes and expectations about the establishment of a democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms, to live safely and in prosperity that is possible only through economic liberty and social justice, and these freedoms being cherished for decades.”[8] In this respect, it must be mentioned that the Paris Charter does not seek flagrant incrimination of communist horrors, but is rather focused on a new beginning; an idea that is like a red thread running through almost the entire document. This reserved attitude towards the need to convict horrors of communism was still determined by the presence of the defunct Soviet Union, which imposed almost an excessively moderate approach to the revaluation of communist past. This expecting attitude that persists is yet another symptom, which will deeply mark the societies’ attitude towards the communist past.

A more consistent document internationally adopted, that has claimed a more accurate and clear attitude towards “the legacy of the past” through its analysis, is the PAEC resolution no.1096 as of 1996. This resolution was preceded by a EC Council of Ministers Recommendation which warned that some countries have adopted legislation to incriminate communism practices that are not very compatible with the Council of Europe practices, urging the monitoring and correcting this situation. Resolution from 1996 would still constitute a relatively timid attempt to terminate the criminal and undemocratic legacy of the past. Starting from an indication regarding the difficulty of the subject on the legacy of the past communist regimes,
mentioning the militarization of public space, excessive centralization and bureaucracy, ideological monopoly, the opposite was supposed to be continued, and namely the promotion of reforms for building up a real democracy. However, the authors of the resolution did not forget to warn about the risks of transition failure, stemmed from the mismanagement of the past legacy, threats/risks which would suppose: installation of oligarchy instead of democracy, statehood crises, increase in corruption and crime to replace the lawful state and human rights, etc. But the biggest risk that would suggest transition failure would be diversion of the sense of “communism fall” and returning to the totalitarian systems. In this respect, the Resolution recommends a “careful balance between moral repairs and impartial justice, free from retaliation.”[9] Therefore, the main recommendation of the Resolution is “the need for impartial justice without any revenge”, but this meaning also that transitional justice is recommended anyway.

A decade from the 1996 Resolution, the Council of Europe has resumed topics related to the need to convict the criminal totalitarian past of communist regimes. Containing an exhaustive explanation of the communism crimes, defining the main reasons for the communist regimes’ crimes and listing most of the crimes caused by communist regimes, the 2006 Resolution no. 1481, adopted by the Council of Europe, concludes that these serious deviations from the normal limits is the result of policies clearly organized and managed over the years. The resolution also makes it clear that wherever the communist ideology was implemented “either in Europe or anywhere else, it always resulted in mass terror, murders and widespread violations of human rights.” At the same time, the resolution clearly establishes that contemporary states should initiate a profound recognition process for those who are still alive and for the family members of victims of their society, with all the consequences arising out of such fact. And even if the Resolution recognizes that the degree of human rights violation has varied from case to case, the Parliamentary Assembly still condemns any manifestation of mass human rights violation, and calls on the parties and communist forces from the Council of Europe member states to take note of these crimes and to distance themselves from communist totalitarian past, asking to condemn these without any ambiguity.

Even if these were an important step in the international community policy to condemn the horrors of communism, however, it must be mentioned that these resolutions of the PAEC Assembly have been under some criticism, mainly the charges being due to their relativity. Therefore, Radu Preda believes that the PAEC Resolution as of 2006 contains ambiguity because of the fact that although it contains an “exhaustive conviction of crimes of totalitarian communist regimes, however, the resolution does not have the same attitude of exhaustive condemnation of the communist ideology, which was the driving force and foundation of communist regimes atrocities, while also being eloquent ways of manifestation of extremism and terror in political justification at the same time.”[10]
Based on all that was mentioned above, we cannot but agree with the quote from the law that regulates the Czech lustration procedure – “those who do not know their history are condemned to repeat it.” Such lesson was offered to us by some ex-communist countries which, due to the lack of a proper policy towards the communist past, have returned to praising again these authoritarian regimes, forgetting those values and ideals they used to affirm in the early nineties when gaining independence. Lack of sound management of the totalitarian communist legacy is causing increased risks to the processes of democratization, and this requires a more active involvement of the civil society, to be more precise it is that social sphere that should ensure the effectiveness of democratic transition.

References:

3. Ibidem
6. Ibidem
8. The document can be found at http://www.osce.org
CIVIL SOCIETY’S KEY TO
PUBLIC DISCUSSION ON ISSUES CONCERNING
THE SECURITY REFORM
A SOUND PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN MOLDOVAN PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS FROM THE SECURITY SECTOR,
THE MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY

George Niculescu
NATO IS/Defence Policy and Partnership

Introduction

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is about making institutions which are responsible for protecting society more accountable to individual citizens and communities and more responsive to their security needs, while ensuring that they remain effective and efficient in providing security.

One of the main objectives of the SSR is to achieve and maintain a good governance. A key element of good governance in the Security Sector is democratic and civilian control of the national security institutions. This shall ensure that public resources are effectively and efficiently spent on responding to security threats and risks. The challenge is to make sure that security is not a larger burden than it should be for the people of a democratic nation. Democratic and civilian control involves legislative and executive measures to have the people directly involved alongside their representatives in formulating and supervising security policies development and implementation.

SSR's success relies heavily on the cooperation of governmental and non-governmental actors. A key ingredient in success will be the ability to gain supporters and convince the public that the norms and policies implied by the SSR are worthy and valid. This requires that NGO's and the wider public are involved into the consultation and decision-making processes. To meet this requirement, information about the security sector institutions, policies and practices should be widely available to the public, while maintaining the confidentiality of classified information. Good governance of the security sector depends on fostering the greatest degree of transparency possible within the limits of preserving the integrity of legitimate national security interests.

Combating terrorism is mainly the responsibility of state institutions; the essential basis for success is an effective national cross-government counter-terrorism strategy, which sets out clear and measurable objectives for all relevant departments and agencies, including law enforcement, intelligence, military, interior and foreign affairs. Effective national mechanisms for coordinating the implementation of the national strategy, in particular the work of law enforcement and intelligence agen-
cies, as well as regional and international cooperation, are the key to success. However, a vibrant civil society can contribute to these efforts by playing a critical role in protecting local communities, in countering extremist ideologies, and in dealing with political violence. Civil society may give a voice to different social groups and causes, which provides a channel of expression for the marginalized and can promote a culture of tolerance and pluralism.

Civil society groups can play a significant role in building local support for counterterrorism through education, lobbying government authorities to adopt a holistic response that respects human rights, monitoring implementation of counterterrorism measures, investigating and publicizing abuses committed in the name of fighting terrorism, promoting the importance of peace and security, and providing capacity-building. Further, civil society can help increase the state's awareness of the threat and of the impact an attack can have on local communities, and in deepening public support for government action to address it.

Terrorists thrive on publicity by any means. Mass media and civil society can help counteract their propaganda and claims to legitimacy, as well as preventing terrorists from exploiting media reports in their communication. Increasing interaction of public institutions with the media would enhance people's awareness as to the dangers of terrorism and would make sure that the media would not be used or manipulated by terrorists.

The dilemma faced by democracies is that the struggle against terrorism can involve the imposition of restrictions on liberties and freedoms. A balance has to be struck between the priorities of security and democracy, i.e. between the need to protect societies and to maintain civil liberties. The usual requirement for secrecy and confidentiality of certain defense and security information is often compounded by the reluctance of many bureaucracies to share information with outsiders, frequently for reasons of status, turf or professional mistrust. The resulting restrictions on the free flow of information sit uneasily with the commitment of countries to openness, transparency and accountability. Frequently, such restrictions might lead the civil society to reciprocate them with mistrust and suspicion of governments, which could make cooperation even more difficult. Getting the right balance between security and liberty means having all actors realizing that, in the end, everyone, the representatives of the government, of the media and civil society, has a responsibility to act, and that their own objectives could benefit from working together.

Background

In spring 2009, the Anti-Terrorist Centre (ATC) of the Security and Information Service (SIS) was considering enhancing its cooperation with the media and the civil society. Enhanced cooperation by the Moldovan institutions with the media and civil society would encourage greater involvement of civilians, including journalists,
think-tank experts and scholars, in shaping and implementing defence and security policies of Moldova.

In support of this effort, the NATO International Staff/ Defence Policy and Planning Division, the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF), and the Pro Marshall Center of the Republic of Moldova co-organised an international workshop on “Enhancing Cooperation of Moldovan Public Authorities with the Media and the Civil Society in the Fight against Terrorism”, on 8 December 2009, in Chisinau. The purpose of this international workshop was to discuss relations among relevant Moldovan public authorities, the media and the civil society in combating terrorism in view of identifying ways and means to strengthen their effective cooperation.

Over 30 representatives of relevant public institutions, media and civil society from Moldova participated in this workshop, alongside with experts from Lithuania, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine, as well as from the NATO International Staff, the OSCE Action against Terrorism Unit, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and DCAF. The workshop was organised in the framework of NATO’s Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism. However, discussions and recommendations in this workshop were not limited to combating terrorism but they addressed relations with the media and civil society in Moldova on defence and security matters more broadly.

The main conclusion of the workshop was that a partnership between security sector institutions, the media and civil society was needed with a view to raising national preparedness for crisis situations. It should be built upon improving relevant institutional arrangements, procedures and practices, as well as upon increased mutual trust through the promotion of transparency and openness.

The next part of this presentation will draw on the discussions of, and recommendations put forward by the Moldovan and international experts attending the workshop.

State of Play

Since September 2009, the Moldovan authorities have made of European integration their top political priority, expressing a firm commitment to make the country eligible for EU membership, and to conduct broad reforms including in the area of strengthening the rule of law. Protection of human rights, liberalization of the media, ensuring the freedom of expression of citizens, strengthening the civil society and its cooperation with the public sector are key aims which have been included in the political program of the Government. In this context, high level officials attending the workshop on 8 December 2009 highlighted the readiness of Moldovan authorities to pursue an active dialogue and cooperation with the media and the civil society on implementing defence and security sector reforms, as well as on combating terrorism. They referred to the inclusion of representatives of the civil society in the IPAP Implementation Commission, the intention to review and approve in 2010
the National Public Information and Public Diplomacy Strategy on Defence and Security Issues, and the development of an information and communication strategy on preventing and combating terrorism.

Consistent with its commitments in cooperation with NATO, Moldova should develop appropriate effective and transparent procedures for enabling participation of civilians in governmental defence and security institutions, and for facilitating cooperation with non-governmental organisations and the media. To meet this objective, Moldova should encourage civil society involvement in defence and security policy formulation, and improve the access of the media and the public to relevant information.

However, several speakers at the workshop on 8 December 2009 noted that the Moldovan media and civil society had a limited impact on the development of national strategic documents, partly due to relatively limited expertise available. It also appeared that current Moldovan authorities were committed to involving the media and civil society in defence and security policy formulation. Discussions highlighted also that Moldova would benefit from international assistance in the shape of relevant advice, experience sharing and education and training for both civil servants and representatives of the media and civil society.

Several participants at the workshop also highlighted the essential role of the civil society in preventing terrorism. Specific reference was made to Moldovan NGOs working on strengthening respect for human rights and the rule of law, and on promoting democratic accountability. The civil society should play an essential role in informing and educating the public in this area. However, it appeared in the discussion that currently there were few Moldovan civil society experts able to perform such a role.

According to a speaker at the workshop of 8 December, in the past, Moldovan journalists were not reporting about the full spectrum of terrorism for lack of information, lack of expertise on defence and security matters, and limited practical cooperation with Moldovan authorities. Efforts by several NGOs, including the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Chisinau, to inform and train journalists on defence and security matters were highlighted in the discussion, as was the need to multiply such efforts in the future including through foreign assistance.

**Recommendations**

The recommendations presented by experts attending the workshop on 8 December 2009, might be clustered into three areas:

1. Develop a coherent public information policy on defence and security matters.
2. Establish an effective civilian oversight of security sector institutions.
3. Build links between the Parliament, media, and civil society in exercising oversight of the defence and security sector.
1. Develop a coherent public information policy on defence and security matters

Moldova should develop a set of policy documents defining the structures and procedures for the release of information to the public. Procedures should address: how information could be retrieved by interested parties; the handling of public requests for information; and the proper use of resources (people, budgets, and infrastructure). A coherent public information policy would be a powerful tool for enhancing the confidence of the Moldovan public in the quality and trustworthiness of the information released by public authorities. Without such a policy, Moldovan authorities would have difficulties in obtaining public opinion support for implementing national strategic objectives. A coherent public information policy should: confirm constitutional and legal rights of the public and the media to access information; prevent arbitrary refusals of release or manipulation of information; restrain secrecy at an acceptable level; prevent misinterpretation of facts in the absence of official information or through the use of alternative sources of information.

The adoption of a National Public Information and Public Diplomacy Strategy, as jointly developed by public authorities, the media and civil society, would be a first step towards a coherent Moldovan public information policy on defence and security matters. During the workshop, it was also suggested to develop a strategy for communication on the implementation of the IPAP and to involve the media in this effort.

2. Establish an effective civilian oversight of security sector institutions

Civilian oversight helps ensuring that objectives and policies of national security institutions are beneficial for the society as a whole. Moldova should strive to establish an effective civilian oversight of its security sector institutions. Civilian oversight can help ensuring that governmental objectives and policies are beneficial for the society as a whole. This would entail: structural reforms aiming at bringing them in line with European standards; reviewing national legislation to allow regulated access to information by the media and civil society; organising public debates on national security policies, including on preventing and combating terrorism; contributing to building an expert community within the civil society and the media by supporting relevant education and training programmes; assisting academic institutions to enrich their curricula and research programs with topics relevant to combating terrorism; and promoting institutional communication and public relations projects.

The main goal of institutional communication and public relations projects would be to present the security sector institutions to the Moldovan public as politically independent, and aiming at defending Moldovan citizens against current security challenges by relying on experienced experts, and by actively cooperating
Civil Society’s Key to Public Discussion on Issues Concerning the Security Reform

with other states and international organisations (including the United Nations, the OSCE, the European Union, and NATO). Possible projects might aim at raising public awareness and enhancing communication with the media and civil society on topics such as: the terrorist threat and the need for Moldova to contribute to combating this scourge; the role of Moldovan security institutions in preventing and combating terrorism, including on protecting critical infrastructures; the profile of the professional officers in security institutions, the educational opportunities and the career path within the security sector institutions. In preparing such projects, Moldovan institutions may consider the experience of NATO Allies’ security services.

3. Build links between the Parliament, media, and civil society in exercising oversight of the defence and security sector

In exercising oversight of the defence and security sector, the Moldovan Parliament, the media and civil society should foster an active dialogue and cooperation on issues of mutual interest, including on combating terrorism. Parliaments, the media and civil society are usually natural partners in exercising democratic oversight, in particular in countries in democratic transition where limited communication in the past might have created mutual mistrust. Parliaments and civil society share common goals, including: holding the government and other public authorities accountable, informing and providing transparency regarding decisions, and acting as relays of public opinion. Parliaments need to be able to rely on independent sources of information rather than just information provided by the Executive. At the same time, Parliamentarian oversight creates the transparency needed by the civil society to fulfil its role as watchdog on defence and security matters. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly could assist in building such links through exchanging experience and providing appropriate training to relevant Moldovan parliamentarians, staffs, as well as to representatives of the media and civil society.

Conclusions

In conclusion, with a view to developing a partnership between Moldovan public institutions, media and civil society, a number of steps should be made:

- Approving and implementing a national public information and public diplomacy strategy on defence and security issues;
- Strengthening the ability of the media and civil society to interact with public institutions;
- Developing a coherent public information policy on defence and security matters;
- Establishing an effective civilian oversight of the Security Sector institutions;
• Fostering dialogue and cooperation between the parliament, media and civil society in exercising oversight of defence and security institutions.

NATO’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and Planning and Review Process (PARP), as well as the EU-Moldova Action Plan should be geared to implementing these steps. In addition, foreign assistance supporting relevant education and training for both public institutions personnel, and members of the media and NGO’s community is urgently needed.
CIVIL SOCIETY AS A KEY ACTOR IN INITIATING CHANGE: THE CASE OF MOLDOVA

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“Democratizing a country is a goal of heroic proportion, but a reachable goal when ordinary people feel and behave like citizens”.

Zamira Djabarova (2002)

1. Introduction

The Republic of Moldova currently finds itself at political crossroads. The parliamentary elections in 2009 and the subsequent public protests led to a change in government from the eight-year-long reign of the Communist Party of Moldova to a four-party coalition with a clear pro-Western orientation. However, as the governing coalition still did not have the majority required to elect a new president, the Constitutional Court in March 2010 ordered parliament to be dissolved and fresh elections held, which were subsequently scheduled for November 2010. This interim status between two path breaking elections places this young democracy in a unique position, in which it seems worthwhile to consider the country’s political decision making process in times of transition and, more specifically, the role of civil society as an actor in that process. In transitional societies, where a change in the political regime takes place along with far-reaching socio-economic reforms, the political and societal elite, among them civil society actors, play a significant role in facilitating public discussion and initiating political change. Therefore, the reconstitution of civil society, where it had been suppressed or neglected formerly, is an essential part of any process of democratization.

This chapter aims at analyzing the overall development of Moldovan civil society actors towards initiating public discussion on political issues and the promotion of a liberalization of the political process in the Republic of Moldova. By discussing typical civil society activities and functions, it first sets the framework for an analysis of Moldova’s current civil society capacities. The paper then takes a look at the advantages and disadvantages of the Moldovan setting, before it is making suggestions for the future role of and contributions to the country’s civil society.
2. Civil Society: A multiple concept

“Civil society” is a broad concept that includes various connotations. Basically, it has to do with the participation of citizens in political and social activities that take place in the public sphere, outside the private realm of the family and the activities of the state. The term covers a wide range of diverse organizations, which in reality overlap with each other. Mary Kaldor distinguishes between social movements, NGO’s, social organizations and nationalist and religious groups (Kaldor 2003:12). Frequently, civil society activists take particular social or political deficiencies as a starting point and then, as part of their work, deal with the amelioration of these deficits and a precondition for that is certainly the ability of normal citizens to identify these shortcomings. This is why openness to debate is an important characteristic of civil society. This is also pointed out in the definition of Howell & Pearce (2001:2), who assert that civil society is “an intellectual space, where people in a myriad of different groups and associations can freely debate and discuss how to build the kind of world in which they want to live”. And Graham Gill notes that civil society exists “when there is a sphere of activity outside direct state control, in which the citizenry may organize to pursue their own interests and concerns in their own way“. (Gill 2000: 59).

For the purposes of this analysis, the article below will focus on those civil society groups and organizations (NGO’s) that deal with the political decision-making process, concentrating on relevant actors in the political arena. To this end, three different layers describing the political sphere of a country can be identified:

a. the political culture of a country, b. the level of political participation and c. the question of political exclusion/inclusion. Each of these, point to certain civil society activities, which are shown in an overview in Table 1, and described in greater detail below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Layers of the political sphere</th>
<th>Possible civil society activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Political Culture</td>
<td>Investigate level of political trust, historic heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investigate and enhance (if necessary) social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Political Participation</td>
<td>Investigate character of participation (voluntary / manipulated / regimented?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhance voluntary participation (if necessary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offer civic learning &amp; engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Political exclusion - inclusion</td>
<td>Reach out to excluded or marginalized groups</td>
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The term “political culture” refers to the “overall patterns of beliefs, attitudes and values in a society towards a political system” (Hague & Harrop 2007:103). This
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concerns questions of political trust (How much do citizens trust their government?) and the question of social capital, a concept, popularized by Robert Putnam in the 1990s, that measures the ability of a community to develop a level of trust and cooperation which makes collective action possible and effective (see: Putnam 1993). Here the relevant questions are: How much social capital exists? Are there different levels in different regions of Moldova? Political culture is seen as particularly important in liberal democracies, since the connection between society and governments are especially strong in this type of regime, but it is also essential to measure political culture in illiberal democracies. Hague and Harrop point out the many differences between the two types: “Where institutional development facilitates liberal democracy, a culture of personal politics fosters at best illiberal democracy. Once elected (and then re-elected), the ruler of an illiberal democracy functions as father and chief patron to the nation, providing security and stability but not day-to-day democratic accountability.” (Hague & Harrop 2007:112) In the Moldovan case, two questions arise here: How much respect for restraints on power and individual rights are typical for the political culture of the country? And, how does the history of Moldova as an authoritarian regime impact today’s political culture? An additional aspect here is the quality of the elite political culture in the country, as the ideas of the elites are distinct from, though they overlap with, the national political culture. As political elites are closest to the centers of political power, it is supposed that their values are more explicit, systematic and consequential than are those of the population at large (Verba 1987:7). Empirical evidence shows that political elites play a significant role in transitional societies. Therefore, the questions at this point become:

Is the elite aware of its roles and responsibilities with respect to the citizenry? And does the elite accept the notion of a national interest, separate from individual and group ambitions?

b. the level of political participation, refers to “the many ways in which people can seek to influence the composition of policies of their government” (Hague & Harrop 2007:165). One can assert, that civil society groups play a pivotal role in bridging the gap between the formal political process of a country and its citizens. Political participation can be voluntary, manipulated or regimented (ibid.). Because in illiberal democracies the amount of participation is often limited and mainly channeled through elections, civil society groups have a clear line of action during the transition towards a liberal democracy to raise the level of information among citizens about political rights and duties. This could happen by offering civic education and opportunities for citizens’ engagement in political issues, for example by assisting the formation of citizens’ initiatives or action groups. The question for the Moldovan case seems to be: How far did the public self-concept of citizens transition from the old Soviet-style concept to that of a liberal democracy? How can (voluntary) political participation be enhanced?
A third layer of the political sphere, which is closely connected to the participation level, is the field of political exclusion versus inclusion. The term refers to “those people who are effectively excluded from participation in collective decision-making because they occupy a marginal position in society” (Hague & Harrop 2007:167). Individuals with a low level of education, unemployed people or persons with a migration background and/or insufficient language skills do belong to marginalized groups significantly more often than do other societal groups. They therefore have a higher risk of being excluded from the political process. Each society has to deal with a certain amount of excluded or marginalized groups, as the idea of “universal participation and political equality coexists alongside the fact of limited and unequal involvement” in reality (ibid, p.168). A disconcerting development, however, is the repeatedly reported phenomenon of “non-participation”, a low voter turnout in elections, low levels of interest in politics and declining organizational membership in new democracies (Peci & Dugolli 2009:238). This may point to a sort of ‘voter fatigue’, or moreover a “citizens’ fatigue” which is not desirable in democratic societies, as they favor politically active and informed citizens. Here, a further field of activity opens up for civil society groups in reaching out to marginalized groups of society and in encouraging them to exercise their citizen’s rights.

The overall picture shows that the formation of a vibrant civil society is strongly linked to any democratic regime, but supports in particular the transformation process from an illiberal towards a liberal democracy as it focuses on citizens’ rights and duties.

3. Moldova: A country in transition with a developing civil society

In the literature on state consolidation and democratization, the Republic of Moldova is categorized as a transitional country. However, experts agree that during the last decade the transformation process slowed down and is stagnating today. While benchmarked as a country with significant levels of political pluralism, the existing elements of democracy in the country “are neither consolidated nor guaranteed to last” (Popescu & Dura 2007:472). Most notably, since the declaration of independence in August 1991, the secessionist conflict with the breakaway region of Transnistria has not yet neared a real solution, despite continued diplomatic efforts. Moldova remains one of the poorest countries in Europe with structural economic problems typical for a country transitioning towards market economy (Busuncian 2009:296). Although significant steps towards anti-corruption strategies have been adopted, the success is qualified as modest at best (Kovalova 2009:313). Concerning the overall human development, the “HDI-Index” of the United Nations, which measures life expectancy, literacy, education, standard of living and GDP per capita for countries worldwide, places the Republic of Moldova at the rank of 114 (out of 177 countries) in the year 2006 and on 117 in the year 2009, which illustrates a setback (UNDP
2009). In its overview for the year 2010, the “Freedom in the World”-Index, which measures political rights and civil liberties evaluates Moldova as a “partly free” country, with the breakaway region Transnistria as “not free” (Freedomhouse 2009).

The development of civil society is measured in greater detail in the annually published “Nations in Transit”-Report. Since the last decade, the civil society score for the country has stagnated at an average level with the score of 3.75 in the year 1999/2000 and again on the same level of 3.75 a decade later in 2009 (on a 1-7 scale with 1 as the best mark). The 2007 country report assesses the country’s civil society capabilities in a rather pessimistic manner: “Civil society in Moldova is weak. Most nongovernmental organizations (NGO’s) would not be sustainable without foreign financial support” (Popescu & Dura 2007:473). The structural weakness of civil society, which derives from a weak relationship between citizens and the state, has been reported as a typical heritage of post-communist democracies (Howard 2002:5). During the time of the Voronin government, the state did not restrict NGO activity. It even undertook a commitment to give NGOs an option to comment on all draft legislation discussed in parliament and established a “National Council for Participation”. The council was seen as “one of the few positive tendencies in the sector in 2008” by independent observers (Vitu 2009:369). However it also aroused suspicion that these moves were made primarily in order to meet European Union expectations, which had explicitly included respect for the freedom of association and the fostering of the development of civil society as a goal in their EU/Moldova Action Plan of the European Neighborhood Policy (see: Action Plan 2005).

When in April 2009, after the parliamentary elections, civil protests turned into violent rioting, there were allegations that the violence was provoked by plain-clothed officers in the crowd. While Amnesty International immediately warned Moldovan authorities not to hold civil society activists responsible for the rioting, later allegations of systematic mistreatment and abuse of detained demonstrators emerged (Amnesty 2009). With the inauguration of the AEI government (Alliance for European Integration) in August 2009 and the installation of a new Prime Minister, Vlad Filat, the relationship between civil society and the government improved significantly. The various civil society “organizations reacted promptly to the changing demands of society”, proposing both immediate and long-term actions, such as a comprehensive reform of the security sector (Vitu 2010: 363), at the same time, the government showed considerable openness and interest in cooperating with civil society. A snapshot of today’s situation reveals that the civil society sector of Moldova is highly professional, with quite a few former government employees serving as active members. However, Moldova’s civil society structures have limited human resources and are almost exclusively concentrated in the capital city, which at this point poses a challenge to a more comprehensive pursuit of their tasks (Deimel et al. 2010:7).
4. More than meets the eye: An optimistic outlook for Moldovan civil society

A vibrant civil society that is engaged in enhancing the political participation of the citizenry, one that contributes to a high level of civic education among the populace and one that adds to social capital is certainly a goal for any country. However, it seems to be of particular significance in the transition from an illiberal to a liberal democracy, because here, ideally, a broadening of the range of political actors from the political elite to include a broader spectrum of active citizens takes place. From the standpoint of the citizen, the most striking difference between an illiberal and a liberal democratic system is the fact that in a liberal democracy people have an opinion on most every topic in the political realm and at the same time have the assertiveness to articulate their opinion in public -- if need be via citizens’ action committees and pressure groups. In any case, the specific historical, cultural and social background of a country has to be taken into account. Therefore, the following chapter weighs advantages and disadvantages of the Moldovan case against each other and makes suggestions for the way ahead.

The disadvantages that the Moldovan civil society faces can be summarized in three main challenges. The first challenge consists of the above mentioned weak traditions, which have been detected in many post-Communist societies where the citizenry traditionally remained widely disengaged from the public sphere. The second challenge consists in the heritage of the Soviet era, which oftentimes entailed regimented participation in political events (elections, demonstrations, party events, etc.) and which may nowadays lead to a veritable credibility problem, particularly if civil society appeals to enhancing the political participation of its citizens, but this is not clearly distinguished from traditional ways of participation. Thirdly there is a difficulty to engage people and to sparking interest in things political, which is particularly pressing in times of transition. Most transitional countries experience economic difficulties, which translate into harsh living conditions in which citizens primarily, have to deal with their sheer survival. In such an environment, socio-political activities may be seen as no more than a mere pastime for those who can afford it.

By the same token, the comparative advantages of the country’s civil society do actually outnumber the disadvantages and can be summarized as follows: The most obvious advantage is the tailwind created by the switch in government following the July 2009 elections, which sparked a wave of optimism in the political future among citizens (Kramer et al. 2010). The current forward-looking atmosphere can be also helpful for civil society goals. Furthermore, in comparison with other countries and regions of the post-Soviet space, Moldovan society does not have to deal with apparent extremist or intolerant groups, nor are any violent groups or private militia groups active in the country (Popescu & Dura 2007). Another advantage is the advanced diffusion of modern communication instruments (like cell phones, and the
use of social media (blogging etc.) among citizens. These are powerful tools for the
association and mobilization of citizens – even beyond the limits of the capital city.
A further advantage can be seen in the geographical vicinity to Western Europe,
from which the country as a whole and civil society may benefit. This makes cross-
regional cooperation and association, and even simple travel arrangements easier
and more viable. Last, but not least, civil society actors in the country need to think
about opportunities to link into global movements and utilize those platforms for
information exchange. When a contact is established, they can then launch local
branches, and in this way attract more foreign interest by including the country in a
network of global civil society (Keane 2003).

One of the deficiencies of the current situation is a gap between the multitude of
(new) democratic political processes and the lack of knowledge on the part of the av-
erage citizens about the process of transitioning towards a liberal democracy. Politi-
cal processes have to be learned, new roles as active citizens have to be adopted and
internalized. Here, a nationwide independent institution which picks up these topics
and gives assistance in “civic learning and engagement” would fill the gap. There,
individual citizens as well as groups and associations may obtain advice and reading
materials on political topics. The overall mission of this institution can be described
as creating a better understanding of political issues, fostering democratic awareness
and enhancing the readiness for political participation. A goal would be to take on
current political topics and to produce and distribute free publications on these top-
ics. In order to be able to reach out to all citizens, it would be of utmost importance
that this “civic learning” institution not only be located in the capital city, but have
additional local branches in other parts of the country, creating opportunities for
visits for school classes, students and ordinary citizens from all parts of Moldova.\footnote{Institutions for civic education exist in many Western countries. The German „Bun-
dezentrale für Politische Bildung“ (BPP) (www.bpp.de) or the U.S. based “Center for infor-
mation & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement” (CIRCLE) (www.civicyouth.org) have
similar goals and missions and may act as prototypes for the founding of a similar institution in
Moldova.}

When looking at possible civil society activities and in consideration of the spe-
cific country setting, one can say that the current transitional phase poses a unique
opportunity for civil society to reconstitute its operational capacity and range at a
new and more elaborate level. As prior experience has shown, the transformation
of a society towards liberal democracy, open society values and market economy is
a comprehensive and tedious process which may take decades. The contributions
of a civil society play a key role in the process. Its input should be geared towards
creating transparency and trust in civil society institutions in the first place; it should
make clear that today’s goals and aims differ significantly from former times. It could
thereby achieve the goal of regaining credibility among the population. It can also
help create higher levels of social capital, a goal that seems to be of special impor-
tance in new democracies. One of the core functions of civil society may be further activities which are dedicated towards creating more political participation and reversing “voter fatigue”. In addition, civil society may enable societal discussion about the state of the transformation process as a whole (democratization, value shifts, inclusion of marginalized groups). And, finally, it should strengthen its role as an independent observer of political processes and sharpen its role as a vanguard for democratic transition in Moldova.

References:

SECURITY AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE: PERSPECTIVES FOR MOLDOVA

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Firstly it should be remembered that “security” is a wide concept and not only restricted to matters of military defence. There can be social security, environmental security, which also play a role in stabilising a democracy. Internal political stability and the capacity to withstand stress and crises are also attributes of a security system. Most participants have agreed that the chronic weakness of the democratic culture in Moldova had been an impediment to progress. This resounded as a leitmotiv of the conference.

Through the briefings and meetings with local politicians and experts, it became clear that Moldova is facing a period of uncertainty, for ex. in the constitutional and political arena which compounds other problems in the economic and social fields.

One of the perceived solutions discussed seems to be a thorough overhaul of the Constitution to break, amongst other things, the deadlock concerning the election of the president of the Republic. However, experience has shown in other countries, for ex. Ukraine that an ongoing debate on constitutional norms is not productive and can lead to more polarisations in society.

Many of the experts during the conference stressed the importance of finding a consensus in society, something which was widely acknowledged by Moldovans taking part. To build this, however, it is helpful to start and focus on those questions where there is broad agreement. The Constitution does not seem to be one of these, and so, a protracted debate could lead to further antagonism. Also, it is important to have clear constitutional norms, the “rules of the game”, which should not be radically changed so often or whenever there is a problem. This undermines confidence in the system per se, furthering weakening the democratic viability of a country. Constitutional reform impacts on vested interests and power, and therefore change is not always a simple thing to achieve. Until these constitutional and political problems are resolved, for ex. possibly in upcoming elections, then Moldova feels particularly vulnerable. Clearly, the events of last year shocked those involved and proved how quickly things can get out of control and keel over. Strengthening the political institutions therefore would seem to have priority in helping the country to overcome such a shock. Part of this includes understanding what government is about, but also means appreciating the role of opposition in a democracy. The involvement of civil society in this process can be of some benefit.
From the experience of past work (Institute for Parliamentarism and Democracy Questions) in the southern Ukraine and elsewhere, we can see that cultural projects tend to unite rather than divide. Understanding the common culture and affinities help bring together and create an atmosphere conducive to consensus.

Briefly, the Lisbon Treaty was discussed in one of the sessions, but not considered to be of vital importance. However, provisions in the Treaty with regard to for ex. national parliaments and their greater role as well as the regions and communities, should be studied and appreciated. This is one area of work which in the future could give people, civil society a greater involvement overcoming the general feeling of dissatisfaction with politics (or rather politicians), which is rampant in many countries in the EU (see www.parlamentarismus.at).

It seems that Moldova is ready to seek outside advice and build on the experience of others. One possible problem seems to be the plethora of projects and advice offered to Moldova, and here it must be clear what happens with all this in concrete terms. Not all points discussed or put forward at such meetings can be translated into practice, but it would be useful to set some modest aims so that progress could be tangible, encouraging further work. A series of well meant conferences is a useful input and start, but not cost efficient in stabilising and consolidating a democratic process.

Political participation is an important element in this, and the involvement of all groups in a democracy, for ex. women, is also important. The Institute for Parliamentarism and Democracy Questions (Vienna) has produced a number of studies and also a strategy, which was put forward at a recent OSCE conference (for more details see www.parlamentarismus.at) to enhance the participation of women in politics and legislatures.

One issue, where broader consensus seemed to be, was in the relation of Moldova and its future closer relationship with the European integration process. The expectations seemed to be high, with a tendency to see Europe as a panacea for all Moldova’s ills. The problem of disillusionment is always present in this scenario. The right balance needs to be struck.

**Recommendations:**

1. Projects with clear aims that have defined goals in terms of time and policies which can realistically be translated into practice.
2. Strengthening the democratic culture, as one way to build political stability internally, confidence and ultimately security.
3. Awareness of the region and interlocking with projects, for ex. in the Black Sea region, a priority for many countries in the EU.
4. Familiarity with multi-layer governance, and the Lisbon Treaty as a way of increasing the understanding of the potential that civil society could have in the
future European parliamentary process. Furthering goals, other than just wanting to get into Europe, by increasing awareness of its workings to help promote policies for Moldova.

5. Increased emphasis on internet accessibility to help dock the country to the information highway of the EU countries as well as the promotion of long distance learning and short intensive courses in democracy culture, parliamentarism.

6. Promotion and encouragement of political participation among groups underrepresented for ex. women in politics.

Thank you to the organisers and sponsors of this conference, which have been an excellent basis for further cooperation!
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS AND PUBLIC DISSCUSION ON ISSUES CONCERNING THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

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Introduction

Civil society is the instrument to make the Government behave properly in the public domain. The problem is that civil society is a social entity hard to define or even to self-define. Different segments of society claim that they are the genuine representatives of civil society, but more than often they fail to demonstrate this claim through their actions. For that reason only, in this presentation we will not discuss the civil society as such, but only the conditions of civil society organisations (CSOs) populating the civil area of the security sector in the the Republic of Moldova. At least these organisations have the legal status of approaching issues of public concerns holding the specifics of the civil society.

The following discussion is based on direct or empiric observations made by me remotely during the last year, and the opportunities given to all participants during the last two days of this roundtable when we were able visit some of these CSOs and discuss with some of their representative persons.

In order to better understand the impact of CSOs on the public debate referring to issues and concerns of the Security Sector reform (SSR) in Moldova, I have chosen to answer a small bunch of common sense questions. As you may see during my presentation, these questions are: Whom do the CSOs speak and act for in relation to SSR? What are the main products of those organisations and how do they materialize? What do their publications say about the main public concerns and how are they doing this? How do the CSOs reflect the public and the governmental agendas? And, finally, what type of society are the CSOs encouraging to be developed in Moldova?

There may be many other relevant or interesting questions to answer in the framework of a discussion about the civil society and the public debate on national security and the requirements for security sector reform, but we may concede that those mentioned above are good enough for our present discussion.

Before going into the core of my presentation, I would like to note that there are no right or correct answers to the questions I have chosen to make our discussion, especially in the case of the Republic of Moldova, where security realities and national security concerns are so complex and so organically interconnected with other public domains.
The fact that the CSOs in Moldova are omnipresent in public life and in close contact with governmental actions in the area of national security is commendable from the very beginning. There is a comprehensive legislation body governing over their status and activities, and the government is taking onboard representatives from these organisations for many of its projects, especially those involving formulation of strategies and long-term visions. Many individuals working within CSOs staff are invited to join the government in significant positions. At the same time, former senior governmental figures are joining the ranks of CSOs when they leave the public office.

Question #1: Whom do the Civil Society Organisations speak and act for in the Republic of Moldova?

The Civil Society Organisations are well established entities in the Republic of Moldova societal and political architecture. These organisations include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), various institutes and academic forums, and other non-profit organisations lawfully representing different segments of the public or promoting different public interests, values or opinions.

The government is constantly declaring particular interest in their opinions, and works on and encourages, at least formally, a consistent dialogue between them. Moreover, individuals working within these organisations are often selected to work in various governmental positions, while at the same time governmental officials are joining these organisations after they leave their positions in governmental bodies.

Various CSOs are being consulted in the legislative process, as well as in policy formulation at the executive level. Of course, not all CSOs’ visions, opinions or solutions are accepted by the government, and there is always a visible discontent that the voice of the civil society is not listened to enough at the governmental level.

If we have to narrow these observations to the level of CSOs directly concerned with state and security affairs, including SSR, then we have to notice that the advocacy practiced by these CSOs is mostly for the work and achievements of the government and state agencies and less for the people. Representatives of these organisations know intimately what the government is doing in this realm of national security, and are able to express favourable or critical views on the national goals and interests promoted by governmental authorities.

At the same time, less work is done by these organisations to capture the opinions and strategic options of the Moldovan people and to express them in their dialogue with the governmental authorities. We could see these aspects in public appearances where CSOs representatives would easily have an opinion on what the government is doing good or bad in the national security realm, but would hesitate to identify the dominant public opinion on any of the major security concerns or threats to national security.

Also, we can notice that the security of the state is presented well in the public debate, while the security of the individual citizen is much less.
**Question #2: What are the main products of Civil Society Organisations and how do they materialize?**

The main products of CSOs are consistent with the answer given to Question #1. Broadly speaking, these products are mostly in the range of consultancy, advisory and voluntary work for the Government or in relation with the Government. Products intended to be an eye-opener for the public, expert opinion enhancer or voice for public concerns and preferences are less present or even totally absent.

In terms of materialization of these products, all types of conferences are being held. Also one can find a number of publications which show the work and results of Moldovan CSOs.

CSOs’ products are also presented to the public through media channels, especially as occasional media episodes. Other types and formats of these products are less employed by Moldovan CSOs like, for example, university courses or national security curricula, public lectures or debates, media columns or shows.

These facts are easily explained when we start identifying the main beneficiaries of these products. As long as they are the Government or governmental authorities, different types and formats normally employed when addressing the public are obviously less needed.

**Question #3: What do their publications say about the main public concerns and how are they doing this?**

The closing observation in answer to Question #2 may be continued with the argument that the publications are written for the specialised i.e. governmental audience and less for the public at large. These publications consist mostly of studies, analysis, questionnaires and occasional papers, and less scenario development, alternative policies and strategies, or opinion papers.

It is impressive how the CSOs in Moldova manage to speak their mind through these publications. Most of them are critical with the government and propose valuable solutions to many genuine national security concerns and challenges. In a broader view, one may get the impression that, in the realm of national security literature, the CSOs are doing most of the work for the Government.

The only question that pops-up when we see the wonderful work done for the state authorities is: who is doing the work for the people?

**Question #4: How do the CSOs reflect the public and the governmental agendas?**

I ended the answer to the previous question with another question. If we wanted to answer that question, we would look into how the products made by the CSOs reflect the public and the governmental agendas.
On the public agenda, the Moldovan CSOs encourage mostly the following topics: Transnistria; Russian threat related to Transnistria; mobility of Moldovan citizen or the freedom of movement, especially towards Europe; security energy; European integration; strategic partnerships; and security for foreign trade.

Even if most of the people perceive that their security is organically linked with other main topics, such as their welfare, the threat of unemployment and the widespread corruption, the CSOs are less encouraged to have such topics on the public agenda.

On the government agenda, the Moldovan CSOs are interested mostly in the same topics like on the public agenda: Transnistria; Russian threat related to Transnistria; mobility of Moldovan citizen or the freedom of movement, especially towards Europe; security energy; European integration; strategic partnerships; security for foreign trade; and neighbourhood relations.

What is unclear is who proposes the list of topics on these agendas? The general impression is that CSOs are not very active in introducing new topics or in prioritising the existing lists of topics according to the citizen's priorities.

The general topic of national security is present in the public discussion mostly as an information process. The public is informed on the developments of the main security concerns, especially in an international context.

Moldovan CSOs are less active in complementing their role to inform the public on security developments with a broader effort to form public knowledge on security topics. Most of the time, the public is told what is important and what is less important in this realm of national security, and what the best or least appropriate measures to be taken are in order to address the threats or security concerns. There are no visible actions from the civil society organisations aimed at helping the public to discover or understand independently the importance, significance and relevance of any national security topic; or to have a preference for one or the other possible alternative solutions to security concerns.

Many methods of psychological warfare were employed in the public domain especially in relation with the struggle for political power. The year 2010 witnessed several important security episodes that attracted the interest and attention of large masses of people. Apart from their legal or moral contents, these episodes reflected a tendency of replacing the genuine public debate with different formats of propaganda or even manipulation of public opinion, or deception. The CSOs involved in the national security domain did not look to be well equipped with the appropriate tools and mechanisms to counter this tendency.

**Question #5: What type of society are the CSOs encouraging to be developed in Moldova?**

Answering this question would clarify the above-mentioned observations that the CSOs in Moldova are working better with the state then with the public.
Since its independence, the Republic of Moldova is struggling to develop and consolidate a modern state. Broadly speaking, that means this type of state is built on the foundation of a social contract between the state and the citizens, written in the Constitution. This contract is not always favourable to the citizen. It requires that the state is established in a strong and sound way, and is governed wisely in order to be able to provide the best for its citizens. Any time when the state is weak or even failing or it has a visible deficit of good governance, the citizens are asked to support the state up to personal loss or even sacrifice, without getting anything in return from their state.

This condition is most visible in the realm of national security. Normally or naturally, the national security should be a public good, a service produced by the state for all the people, without any distinction. However, in the modern state the security is firstly provided for the state itself, and only after the state is satisfied with its security, then the public is taken into consideration. In other words, any time the security of the state is broken or not sufficient, the discussion will go exclusively in the direction of mending or augmenting this state security, with total or significant disregard to the people.

In the case of Moldova, one may have the impression that its security sector has missions only in relation with the state and not with the people. For example, the national security option of neutrality, as it is stated in the Moldovan Constitution, is important for the state, guaranteeing its independence and sovereignty, but not necessarily favourable for the people, who are divided between East and West in terms of their preferences, and sources for their welfare.

Practically, the modern state was successful only in the era of great wars of the twentieth century, Cold War included, when the state was guaranteeing the very existence of the people and fighting against mass extinctions of populations. The moment this type of threat was diminished or even had disappeared, the premises for developing a post-modern state were provided.

The post-modern state is no longer a contract between the state and the citizen, but an agreement between citizens themselves to live and work together as long as this association is beneficial to all and everyone alike. In the post-modern state the security is provided directly and from the start for every individual, as a public good should do. A good example is the conversion of national defence based on conscription specific to the modern society, calling for every citizen to defend the state, to the national defence based on voluntary professionals, where the state is providing hired security for all the people.

The strategic problem is that Moldova became an independent state at the end of the Cold War, or the end of the invasion era or total destruction wars. The Moldovans started to build their modern state when many other nations in the West were building post-modern societies, or were converting their modern states to post-modern ones. The question is whether Moldova should go all the way to establish a modern
state and, only after this goal is reached convert this type of social organisation into a post-modern one; or Moldova should abandon the modern state project and start building a post-modern society directly.

Or, to be closer to our discussion, the question is whether the Moldovan CSOs should continue supporting the strategic thinking in the realm of security by first delivering for the state, and then for the people only after the state security is totally satisfied; or they should support the post-modern strategic thinking where the citizens come first.

Only the Moldovans know or can find the best answers to these questions.
In general, there is a lot of debate on how civil society actors can influence decisions on security and defense, including the military, police, intelligence services and judiciary. On one hand, a big problem here is the fact that, in matters of security and defense, citizens usually do not know what their priorities might be. It is arguable even whether civil society actors know what these priorities should be, and how they can influence decisions on security and defense.

On the other hand, some argue that the role of civil society is little – if at all – understood by the military and defense sectors, which have traditionally been unwilling to receive any public input. Others state that civil society does not possess either the necessary expertise or interest needed to provide an informed input into a very specialized policy area. In this context, a major objective of the security sector reform should be that of making the sector more transparent, democratic and accountable to and understandable by citizens and communities, and more responsive to their needs.

Nevertheless, civil society can and should play a more important role in encouraging and even determining the state to fulfill its responsibilities transparently and accountably, including in the security and defense field by influencing policy, providing an alternative analysis and helping educate and inform both policy makers and the wider society. The contributions of civil society organizations to the advancement of international peace and security (especially in the prevention and resolution of violence conflicts), particularly since the end of the Cold War, are good examples of prolific collaboration between governments and civil society.

It is common sense, nowadays, to admit that the threat of conventional military attack has declined; yet a re-conceptualisation of security has taken place as a result of the events in the last two decades (such as the collapse of the communist systems, increasing global integration and the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001). A new concept of security was developed, linking together broad categories of activities: terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, trans-border crime, illegal immigration, minority ethnic groups etc.

For example, the European Security Strategy of 2003 asserts that the main threats to Europe’s security are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states and organized crime[1]. Similarly, the 2008 Implementation Report of the European Security Strategy takes into account chang-
es in the strategic environment and identifies “global challenges and key threats”, bringing the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the forefront (North Korea, Iran and a renewed worldwide interest in nuclear energy with its associated risks account for this new priority). Terrorism and trans-national organized crime are still mentioned as major concerns. Moreover, the same report emphasizes **emerging risks**: climate change, cyber-warfare and energy dependence[2].

At the same time, according to the “**Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO**”, dated 17 May 2010, the future (un)conventional threats could “include attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, terrorist strikes, and efforts to harm society through cyber assaults or the unlawful disruption of critical supply lines”[3].

NATO experts acknowledge that “the most probable threats to Allies in the coming decade are unconventional, such as: 1) an attack by ballistic missile (whether or not nuclear-armed); 2) strikes by international terrorist groups; and 3) cyber assaults of varying degrees of severity. Other threats also pose a risk, including disruptions to energy and maritime supply lines, the harmful consequences of global climate change, and financial crisis”.

At the global level, the international security environment will most probably change in the next decade as – from a security standpoint – events in one part of the world will have repercussions elsewhere. For example, as stated by NATO experts, “anarchy in one country can create an opportunity for terrorists to find a safe haven from which to operate across any border. A nation that evades global norms and gets away with it creates a precedent that others might follow. A cyber attack that leads to chaos in one city may inspire copy-cat criminals in another. Due to the reach of modern media, even terrorist groups and pirate bands now have public relations specialists”.

While it is obvious that NATO and EU remain the central pillars of stability and cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic region, it is also evident that they need a best fitted adaptation to the new reality, as in spite of a low likelihood of a military conflict in the region, many other dangers and risks do persist: trans-national provocations that include terrorism, trafficking in arms, drugs, and humans or proliferation of nuclear weapons.

For being successful in facing the security challenges of the future, both institutions (NATO and EU) need more than military capabilities. They also need a sound argumentation for their cause, long-term efforts to influence public opinion and societal attitudes, while bringing about changes in government, community and institutional policies. With a focus on educating people and raising awareness of what is necessary to achieve a particular goal, advocacy on security should target specific audiences through communication techniques guided by well-crafted strategies and draw upon participatory processes, offering concrete solutions and plans of action[4].
While NATO experts militate for a firm promotion campaign of the Alliance's new Strategic Concept “to populations who know little about it and who may be sceptical about the organisation’s relevance to their lives”[5], the civil society actors could bring a significant contribution to this objective.

In the area of security and defense issues, a potential government – civil society collaboration could be focused on the following subjects[6]:

1. **Formulating the campaign message** – i.e. the discourse is chosen to “frame” the issue, the nature of the policy solutions, as well as the far-reaching policy objectives, are chosen to advocate for. These decisions are made in the very early stages of a new campaign, long before formal inter-governmental negotiations begin. Usually, these choices determine both the scale of the campaign’s potential impact as well as the prospects for success.

2. Activating/mobilizing the political will – civil society advocacy could increase issue awareness by exploiting extensive existing networks, sensitize policy makers through (national or even international level) lobby, and promote a coherent international policy agenda.

   However, when trying to mobilize the political will, there are three important dimensions that are often overlooked:
   - the gains in credibility that come from formal endorsement through international organizations;
   - the political momentum derived from progress in particular situations or by individual states; and
   - the importance of coalitions of like-minded governments in translating abstract policy objectives into effective policy development processes.

3. **Negotiating (international) agreements** by:
   - **Direct civil society contributions**, meaning direct involvement in the negotiation process, although the governments have the lead role during this stage of the process.
   - **Indirect civil society contributions**, for example lobbying governments to prevent making the same mistakes, exposing major compromises proposed behind closed doors, and pressing for substantive improvements to the text under discussion. An effective technique that could be used by civil society organizations in this stage of the process is to advocate for enhancing transparency during the negotiations.

4. **Monitoring implementation** of (international) agreements, either independently, in parallel or jointly with governments.

   Regarding the relative value-added of these two sets of actors (civil society and governments), it varies considerably among the four phases mentioned above: civil society organizations commonly play a very important role in framing the issue and identifying campaign objectives, while governments have a central role in formal negotiations. However, both types of actors play important roles in mobilizing politi-
cal will and in monitoring implementation, with the best outcomes emerging where collaboration between the two is close.

Given all these facts, there can be no doubt that civil society organizations have become key participants in the development of global public policies related to certain security issues (such as preventing or reducing the effects of violent conflicts, promotion of peace, humanitarian actions etc.).

Nevertheless, when dealing with more general security and defense issues, civil society organizations in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe are still faced with obstacles that reduce their effectiveness, such as:

- Civil society is generally weak and it often does not play a significant role in public oversight of security institutions;
- Civil society actors often lack domestic funding and institutional cooperation with government agencies that would enable them to undertake independent studies and serve as a source of independent public scrutiny of defense and security affairs;
- Defense and foreign policymaking remains an exclusive field of the political and administrative elite. Although the idea of broader inclusion of civil society organizations in the monitoring and control of security institutions is officially accepted, existing partnerships between government and civil society organizations tend to favor organizations that support state policy;
- Informed and critical security journalism is generally lacking.

Although difficult and complex, these obstacles could be overcome through sustained efforts made by both civil society organizations and governments. For the beginning, one could stress the importance of “demystifying” the concept of security, putting an end to the notion that “security and defense policy is a government’s exclusive issue”, and bringing the citizens closer to the decisions that affect their everyday lives.

Moreover, civil society organizations must hold governments accountable for the way in which they allocate and spend resources, including in the security and defense sectors, meaning to verify that funds are allotted in a sustainable way, spent efficiently and transparently, with clearly measurable results.

Equally important, civil society actors have to press for governments to allocate resources for informing the population, develop a coherent public information policy on defense and security matters and promote the development of independent institutions for civic learning and engagement

References:


The success of so called “twitter” revolution in Moldova resulted in significant changes in its internal and foreign policy, as well as at the level of civil society. Moldova reinforced its efforts towards European integration. Lots of experienced civil society leaders got their positions in governmental bodies and real leverages of influence on the situation in their country. Moreover, the discourse on the issue of security has been launched in Moldova, and discussing NATO option is not a taboo anymore.

Since Ukraine had almost the same experience as Moldova, I would like to share the Ukrainian good practices and lessons learned about the Euro-Atlantic integration, and in particular, focus on the example of NATO – Ukraine Partnership Network which was supposed to become one of the key civil society actors, with the aim of promoting the process of Ukraine’s integration into NATO, monitoring Ukraine’s progress in implementation of Ukraine-NATO Action Plan, and providing Ukrainians with relevant information about the Alliance. Since Moldova is also implementing IPAP, and the structures mentioned above like the Network might emerge in Ukraine, I believe that Ukrainian experience will be of added value for Moldovan counterparts.

NATO – Ukraine Partnership Network was invented as a uniting horizontal structure, which was supposed to interconnect civil society actors from both Ukraine and NATO countries. The main task of the Network was to provide the Government of Ukraine with assistance in the NATO integration, but also to watchdog the progress of NATO – Ukraine Action Plan and Annual NATO – Ukraine Target Plans implementation. The Network was established under the umbrella of NATO Liaison Office (NLO) and was supported by this particular NATO affiliated structure. It was basically the NLO that managed to gather the representatives of different Ukrainian NGOs and their fellow colleagues from NATO countries.

The Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network for Civil Society Expertise Development was established in order to promote partnership between public organizations from Ukraine, NATO member states and partner countries. Such cooperation was aimed at assisting the Ukrainian non-Governmental sector with more effective facilitation of the development and improvement of the national security and defense policy and the implementation of reforms.
At the first sight, the Network was a clone of another group of organizations named NATO – Ukraine Civic League. However, there were significant differences between the two associations. While the League was focused basically on informing the population about NATO integration – by using organizational and financial instruments provided by NATO Public Diplomacy Division, the mission of the Network was quite wider. It included not only public diplomacy, but also analysis, monitoring, and alternative reporting on the progress of Ukraine’s integration into NATO. Therefore, the role of the League was limited to facilitating.

Since the beginning of the Network functioning, three Task Forces were established within its structure. Task Force I was in charge for the research and draft of policy papers and recommendations in the security sector reform. When determining the priorities of the activities related to the security and defense sector governance in Task Force I, emphasis was placed on the importance of public analysis of laws developed in the security sector, the development of security sector models, integrated assessment of threats, identification of national interests, civilian control over the state’s military organization, promotion of dialogue between the society, the army, and the authorities. The importance of the creation of a functional structure of the security system, and the development of issues related to the transition to contract service, as well as the intensification of the activities of Social Councils at the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was also emphasized.

Task Force II field of expertise was to monitor the NATO – Ukraine Action plan. The spheres of interests and objectives of Task Force II “Monitoring Euro-Atlantic Integration Reforms” (the implementation of the Ukraine-NATO Action plan/annual target plans) were: improvement of future plans – draft of proposals related to reforms; public assessment of the implementation of current plans; identification of positive achievements and preparation of information materials to elucidate the necessity to meet Euro-Atlantic standards.

Task Force III was in charge of public diplomacy, and basically duplicated the activities of the NATO – Ukraine League established earlier.

NLO and Network leading NGOs were quite enthusiastic, since not only fundraising prospects were quite promising, but also state authorities expressed interest in the Network foreseen activities and desire to be engaged. It should be noted that this desire was fully satisfied, and the governmental structure named National Centre for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration (NCEEI) was even created, being one of the contacts for the Network.

A workshop on the activities of the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network was held on November 13 and 14, 2007 in Kyiv, on the premises of the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine. 15 Ukrainian non-governmental organizations, which were concerned with the issues of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine in the security sector, participated in the meeting. The NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine also facilitated the
participation of representatives of NGOs from NATO member states, namely, the Institute for Strategic Studies (Poland), EURISC Foundation (Romania), the Centre for Security Policy (Hungary), Transparency International (Great Britain), the Association for International Affairs (Czech Republic) and ICDS (Estonia). Representatives of Ukrainian state institutions, and namely the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the National Center for Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine, the National Institute for Strategic Studies Among also participated in this meeting.

During the two days, workshops of the Task Force I “Security and Defense Sector Governance”, and Task Force II “Monitoring Euro-Atlantic Integration Reforms” members were held.

The events pursued the following principal objectives: identifying priority issues related to the areas of Task Force activities; determining the methods that public organizations can use to contribute to addressing the above-mentioned issues; determining principal projects of the Task Forces; developing the framework for Task Force projects.

However, despite certain enthusiasm and promising forecasts, the Network activities faced several challenges and dangers.

Firstly, the lack of formal meetings and personal contacts resulted in the fact that, since the very beginning of its activities, the Network’s foreign participants played almost nominal role. On the one hand it was quite natural that the initiative was supposed to belong to Ukrainian side, but on the other hand, the de-facto absence of foreign partners resulted in loss of the Network’s reputation as an international structure.

Secondly, the issue of cooperation with the governmental bodies was another problem. This challenge affected Task Force II. Initially, it was supposed that the cooperation with the NCEEI foresees sharing the information and producing the objectivistic Annual reports on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration progress. However, instead of that, NCEEI refused to share any information and tried to impose its own rules. Basically, the Centre was ready to cooperate, but only through the civil society involvement, while NCEEI would provide the NGOs with access to state funds and tenders, and the NGOs would have to legitimize governmental reports mechanically without any previous research and study instead. A litmus paper for the Network was the assessment of ATP 2007. It provided the evidence of the lack of willingness from Governmental bodies to cooperate and share the information.

Also, there was no progress in the activities of Task Force III. Generally, efforts in the field of public diplomacy demand coordination and cohesion. Task Force III has been lacking these features heavily. Not only Task Force III leaders did not manage to develop any kind of strategy and enrich it with the innovative ideas, but were even unable to coordinate the activities of Network members. It was common practice, when during the same period of time – the NGOs involved in the Network had pub-
lic events in one and the same region of Ukraine, whereas other regions suffered lack of attention.

Besides that, due to sensitivity of NATO issue and controversial attitude of the society towards NATO accession, the activities of Task Force III were quite often lacking media support. On the contrary, the opponents of Ukraine's integration to NATO were able to draw much more media-attention by organizing demonstrations and invigorating scandals.

A serious problem of Task Force III was the lack of organizational capacities when reflecting the Network activities. At present, it is difficult to find on the Network's official website the partners of the Network or information about cooperation. Since June 2006, when the Network was officially launched, only 12 official bulletins have been issued. Despite numerous projects prepared by the Network participants, including quite successful projects of Razumkov Center, only one project is posted on the website; the catalogue of NGOs participating in the Network cannot be accessed; and finally, the information about the Network activity is outdated (the last post is on December 2008).

Among all, Task Force I was probably more or less successful, because it was cooperating with the Ministry of Defense, the governmental body chaired at that time by the devoted and highly-professional Mr. Anatoliy Grytsenko. As Mr. Grytsenko himself originated from Ukrainian civil society, he did not intrude into Task Force I activities and accepted their recommendations.

It should also be mentioned that all Task Forces faced the challenge of weak financial capacities. Initially, it was supposed that the Network activities will be supported directly by NATO, through a specially created Trust Fund. However, discussions on this initiative went no further than wishful thinking. Taking into account that not so many donors were interested in the Euro-Atlantic integration, and moreover, foreign donors’ funds were shifted to governments and aimed at good governance rather than at civil society’s needs, this was a real challenge for the Network.

The profound transformation of Ukraine's external environment has complicated even more its internal challenges. Ukraine's Western neighbors (now democratic NATO–EU) exert a magnetic attraction towards the Euro-Atlantic community, while its increasingly autocratic North-Eastern Russian neighbor has become more assertive and intrusive in tugging towards a Eurasian direction. Heightened tensions between domestic advocates for Russia/CIS and EU/NATO have often resulted in Ukraine's schizophrenic policies pulling in opposite directions[1] which indirectly affected the Network as well.

To sum it up, I would like to emphasize the example of NATO-Ukraine Partnership Network, as the lesson learned by Ukraine in the field of Euro-Atlantic integration, and to suggest the following recommendations for the Moldovan counterparts:

1. Personal contacts do really matter, and every network activity should not exclude the working meetings from the agenda. These are personal contacts
which are helpful both for elaborating the joint strategies and enhancing cohesion.

2. Cooperation with governmental structures is always a challenge for the NGOs. Even in the case of democratic states, NGOs face the danger of being turned into a “useful idiot” for stabilizing complex policy processes. In the case of transit countries, cooperation with governments quite often turns into subordination to the government, which contradicts the A. Tocqueville concept of civil society and questions the very idea of democracy promotion by means of civil society efforts.

3. Lots of attention must be paid to the development of innovative informational campaigns using modern technologies, and also to learning the lessons of successful information campaigns.

4. The members of networks not only have to coordinate their activities in order to avoid duplication, but also have to inform the wider audience about such activities. Ideally, this should be the element of aforementioned informational campaigns, but even limited resources should still be used – e.g. informational bulletins, mailing lists and websites.

5. Fundraising efforts are a crucial part in the process of network development. Although having an umbrella donor organization is of added value, the diversification of financial resources should be considered.

I do believe that the recommendations mentioned in this presentation, as well as the described example of particular unsuccessful Network in Ukraine will be helpful for our colleagues in Moldova. I also believe that Moldovan civil society representatives will be able to avoid the mistakes of their Ukrainian colleagues and manage to enrich Eastern Europe with one more ‘democracy promotion’ success story.

References:

REGIONAL SECURITY
PERSPECTIVES IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBORHOOD
NORWEGIAN EXPERIENCE: LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FOR MOLDOVAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIPS

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Norway’s largest neighbor and challenger at the same time is Russia. Therefore, Norway is maybe as much interested in Russian geopolitics and its attitudes towards its neighbors and immediate neighbors as Moldova is. Norwegian experience with Russia has had another dimension as that of Moldova during the Cold War and is different today as well. However, there can be some lessons to be learnt.

The best strategy while having something to do with Russia, is not giving the Russian partner the impression that Moldova cares very much about him. Moldova is doing too much Russian propaganda, mainly in the Transnistrian conflict, without seeing and willing that. Moldova is discussing too much about Russia and trying to find a solution with Russia for the Transnistrian conflict. The right strategy should be to overthrow the Transnistrian problem on the Russian shoulders; to make Russian responsible for the conflict and feel guilty and embarrassed. Moldova needs good allies, who would negotiate the Transnistrian conflict with Russia in the name of Moldova. Every time Moldova does not get something from Russia regarding Transnistria, she should ask for compensation. Ask neutral countries to negotiate these compensations in the name of Moldova.

Norway is a country, which is wide-known for its role in reconciliation and in peace and conflict resolution processes. Norway’s role can vary from a facilitator and active mediator to an official negotiator at the highest level, mainly in peace processes marked by fundamental asymmetry of power between the negotiating parties. One of the most famous examples is its role in the negotiations that led to the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo agreement in September, 1993. Norway’s role in these processes is not based on simple altruism, since peace policy has become a part of security policy in a globalised world, by helping others. Moldova has a particular geopolitical position, which is of interest for Norway, as its largest border state being Russia. Norwegian peace policy is, therefore, more than involvement in a series of peace processes. Therefore, Norway, through its good expertise and high international status, can substantially contribute to the solution of the Transnistrian conflict.

Moldova has since the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1990 and her declaration of independence in 1991 experienced many successes in her political and economic life. Moldova has since then been going through a number of institutional transfor-
motions and has solved many important tasks in order to become a stable country. Today, Moldova is facing new interesting international challenges.

An independent, efficient and self-confident Moldova is very important not only for the country itself, but also for her immediate and European surroundings.

Moldova needs to increase and optimise its position as a sovereign State.

Having a large diplomatic freedom of action, Moldova can contribute importantly to the regional stability in the Northern Balkans, in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Europe at large.

Moldova has become member of a large number of regional and international organisations. Yet, membership in other multi-lateral European and Euro-Atlantic institutions remains still an objective.

However, Moldova’s foreign policy challenge should be to enhance the country’s geopolitical integrity, ascertain a regional influence and access to as many markets as necessary.

The variety of European and international institutions is impressive. Yet, Moldova has the privilege of choosing from a large number of institutions as arenas in her diplomacy. Moreover, the choices must be made out of a clear assessment of opportunities and needs.

Moldova should decide itself about its alliances and not let international experts, other institutions, like EU, or even other dominant states, like Russia, to decide about Moldova’s institutional choices.

Moldova should have an independent policy for its own people – demos –, not a policy dictated by others.

Moldova’s aspiration to become member of the EU is a very noble objective and the country should certainly continue working in this direction. However, the path to accession is a very difficult one. At the moment, the EU is suffering from a critical disease, which is “enlargement fatigue accompanied by internal digestive problems”.

In the meantime, Moldova could think about other alternatives regarding the country’s foreign policy, while waiting for accession to the EU. Creating new alliances may bring many opportunities for Moldova and increase its position and image in the negotiation process with the EU. One realistic and pragmatic example could be membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and European Economic Agreement (EEA)[1]. Switzerland is interested to welcome new members in order to maintain EFTA’s existence, if Iceland should become a member of the EU. In 2010, EFTA celebrates its 50th and EEA its 15th anniversary. It is a symbolic opportunity to call Genève and send an application for membership this year. Being a member of EFTA, it will be Genève, who will negotiate Moldova’s accession to the EU and to the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and not Moldova itself. Recently, EFTA is negotiating a Free Trade Area with Russia. Again, it will be Genève who would negotiate such a Free Trade Area between EFTA and Russia on behalf of its members and not Moldova and the others alone. The practical advantage out all
of this is that Moldova will not need to permanently knock at a closed EU Commission’s door, but will have others doing it on her name. At the same time, Moldova will have more time to concentrate on the reforms and prepare the future accession to the EU. A large number of the previous members of EFTA have accessed sooner or later the EU. Thus, by the end of the day, membership in EFTA can end-up with membership in the EU, if it still will be of interest for Moldova.

A membership in EFTA should not be one more among the many others, but a calculated one. It could be a plus to some of others. However, at the same time Moldova should start to reduce memberships in some maybe not so efficient organizations, where the country belongs now and concentrate only on several strategic ones for its future foreign policy. The most important result out of that should be the increased reproduction of Moldova’s own independence.

The financial power today is not located in the USA or EU, but in the new coming big powers, like China, Japan and even Russia. The last three countries are still after the financial crisis time, the ones which have the largest gold and foreign currency reserves in the world.

Basically, Moldova needs a market-oriented foreign policy and diplomacy too, giving prioritising access to markets for Moldovan value-chains and lines of production.

The markets for Moldovan products can, in principle, be everywhere. Therefore, Moldova’s “geo-economic strategy” should be pragmatic. The state of Moldova does not need economic relations with market-dominated countries, like France, but with more middle-scale countries, like Switzerland - for its wine products; Turkey - for its agricultural products.

Denmark has had a very similar economy to Moldova’s one. It started as a pure agricultural country and developed into an advanced industrial one. It could be an example to learn. Slovakia started as well as an agricultural country and moved to agricultural equipment and tools’ production, which happened to give much more effective results for its economy.

Moldova should strategically analyse the markets, find the niches and the capabilities for its own products, by joining medium-size partners.

Moldova has a great number of varied natural resources. Her population and their energy and competence are a major asset. Moldova’s location invites to generation employment and to international markets for her products.

The final objective in a long-term perspective is to get Moldova out of the IMF, EBRD and a large plethora of donors’ organisations. Foreign aid is of great importance, when it comes as a supplement to already existing and sustainable growing national structures.

Moldova’s main foreign policy and regional security aim should be to change the State’s position in international relations from a negotiator for donations and grants into an active negotiation partner on high politics. Everything that will in-
crease Moldova’s own position as an independent, sovereign and self-confident State is much better than any membership in EU, NATO, etc. in a long-term perspective.

Policy recommendations for Moldovan Government and civil society

1. An independent, sovereign, efficient and self-confident Moldova is very important not only for the country itself, but also for her immediate and European surroundings.
2. Having a large diplomatic freedom of action, Moldova can contribute importantly to the regional stability in the Northern Balkans, in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Europe at large.
3. Moldova’s foreign policy challenge should be to enhance the country’s geopolitical integrity, ascertain a regional influence and access to as many markets as necessary.
4. Moldova has to make a strategic choice out of a clear assessment of opportunities and needs from a large number of institutions as arenas in her diplomacy.
5. Moldova should decide itself about its alliances and not let international experts, other institutions, like EU, or even other dominant states, like Russia, to decide about Moldova’s institutional choices.
6. Moldova could think also about other alternatives regarding the country’s foreign policy, while waiting for accession to the EU, e.g. membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
7. Moldova needs a market-oriented foreign policy and diplomacy, giving prioritising access to markets for Moldovan value-chains and lines of production.
8. Moldova’s main foreign policy and regional security aim should be to change the State’s position in international relations from a negotiator for donations and grants into an active negotiation partner on high politics. Everything that will increase Moldova’s own position as an independent, sovereign and self-confident State is much better than any membership in EU, NATO, etc. in a long-term perspective.

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1. EFTA is an intergovernmental organisation founded in 1960 on the premise of free trade as a means of achieving growth and prosperity amongst its Member States as well as promoting closer economic co-operation between the Western European countries. Furthermore, the EFTA countries wished to contribute to the expansion of trade in the world at large. Based on these overall goals, EFTA today maintains the management of the EFTA Convention (intra-EFTA trade), the EEA Agreement (EFTA-EU relations), and the EFTA Free Trade Agreements (third country relations). The EFTA Convention and the EFTA free trade agreements are managed from the Geneva office, the EEA Agreement from the Brussels office.
EFTA was founded by the Stockholm Convention in 1960. The immediate aim of the association was to provide a framework for the liberalisation of trade in goods amongst its Member States. At the same time EFTA was established as an economic counterbalance to the more politically driven EEC. Relations with the EEC, later the EC and the EU, have been at the core of EFTA activities from the beginning. In the 1970s the EFTA States concluded free trade agreements with the EC; in 1994 the EEA Agreement entered into force. Since the beginning of the 1990s EFTA has actively pursued trade relations with third countries in and beyond Europe. The first partners were the central and eastern Europe countries, followed by the countries in the Mediterranean area. In recent years the EFTA network of free trade agreements has reached across the Atlantic as well as into Asia.

EFTA was founded by the following seven countries: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Finland joined in 1961, Iceland in 1970, and Liechtenstein in 1991. In 1973, the UK and Denmark left EFTA to join the EC. They were followed by Portugal in 1986, and by Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. Today the EFTA members are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

Being just an intergovernmental organisation, the conditions for accession are much easier than the accession to the EU. The last being something between a federal state and a confederation, a Bund, has a much more complicated institutional and constitutional structure.
EU AND MOLDOVA ONE YEAR AFTER THE LAUNCH OF THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

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Introduction

It has been more than a year since the official launch of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in May 2009, a joint Polish-Swedish initiative that tries to upgrade the framework for relations between the EU and six Eastern European neighbours (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia). The main goals of the EaP are political association and economic integration of the six EaP countries with the EU.

The Eastern Partnership was created to enforce the Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that was launched in 2004, and in that sense it was praised as a good step towards the differentiation of the Eastern and Southern dimensions of the ENP. The EaP was also launched partly as a reaction to the French initiative to form the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) with Europe’s southern neighbours, but the EaP does not entail the creation of new institutions such as in the case of the UfM.

This report intends to present the program as it stands today and the position of the six EaP countries regarding the initiative, with a special emphasis on Moldova. The report will argue that despite some accomplishments, the Eastern Partnership is far from reaching its full potential and clearly needs some visible successes. In the second half, the report argues that Moldova could become the success story needed by the Eastern Partnership, and ends with conclusions and recommendations.

Eastern Partnership – A mixed start

The initiative received mixed support within the EU, with many of EU’s most influential leaders (Nicolas Sarkozy, Gordon Brown, Silvio Berlusconi and Jose Luis Zapatero) not attending the launching summit in Prague. The Partnership received support especially from some Central – Eastern European member states (Poland, Czech Republic, the Baltic states etc.). Countries such as Romania, Bulgaria and Greece were initially rather sceptical about the EaP, fearing a duplication of initiatives with Black Sea Synergy. Initially, the Swedish government actively supported the initiative, but later became less involved in developing the framework created.

Even though the EaP does not preclude EU membership, some saw the initiative as a consolation prize for countries that will not be offered membership into the
Union. This criticism comes down to the fact that in the EaP framework the EU relies on enlargement instruments, but the incentives offered are not those of enlargement, as the EU is not offering these countries the prospect of accession.

The policy was also criticized by Russia, when in March 2009 Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused the EU on seeking to expand its “sphere of influence” in Russia’s neighbourhood. This determined European officials to consistently mention in their discourses that the Eastern Partnership is not directed against Moscow. While the EaP framework allows third countries to participate in various projects (Turkey and Russia are generally considered), this will probably not happen too soon.

But what does exactly the EaP offer?

**What is in the offer?**

The Eastern Partnership offers a bilateral and a multilateral track, the existence of the latter one differentiating the policy from the European Neighbourhood Policy as of 2009. Institutionally, the Eastern Partnership will consist of biannual summits between the heads of states and government of the EU and EaP countries, annual summits of foreign ministers, biannual meetings of ‘thematic platforms’, the Euronest parliamentary assembly and the Civil Society Forum.

Funding wise, the European Commission has earmarked 600 million Euros for the period 2010-2013: 350 million for the multilateral dimension, 175 million for internal reforms (Comprehensive Institution Building programmes) and 75 million for pilot regional development programmes. The main beneficiaries of EaP assistance will be public administrations from the EaP states.

**The bilateral track**

The bilateral track lies at the centre of the EaP. Bilateral relations between the EU and EaP countries will be based on association agreements, deep and comprehensive free trade areas (DCFTA) and visa liberalization agreements.

Bilaterally, funding will be provided for institution-building programmes and regional development programmes. The Comprehensive Institution-Building programmes (CIB) aim to support the EaP governments’ efforts to implement the reforms agreed with the EU. This will be done mainly through twinning programmes, high-level advisors, training and exchanges of personnel from the EaP countries to similar institutions in Member States. The implementation of the programmes will probably start in 2011. The Pilot Regional Development Programmes are modelled on the EU cohesion policy and aim at reducing economic and social disparities between regions by funding project related to infrastructure, SMEs and human capital. However the regional development programmes will only be agreed upon in 2012.
The multilateral track

Besides the more important bilateral track, the EaP adds a multilateral dimension. The EaP multilateral cooperation will be based on four thematic policy platforms: 1. Democracy, good governance and stability; 2. Economic integration and convergence with EU policies; 3. Energy security; 4. Contacts between people. As it was noted[1], some topics covered by the platforms (energy security, environmental issues, people to people contacts etc.) are more multilateral than others (good governance).

The platforms meet at least twice a year at the level of senior officials, and they report to the annual meetings of ministers of foreign affairs. The first EC proposals were presented at the first round of meetings of the platforms in June 2009 and the core objectives and two-year work programmes of the platforms were agreed upon at the second round of meetings in November 2009, and endorsed at the ministerial meeting held in December.

The multilateral track of the Eastern Partnership also contains a number of flagship initiatives that aim to give substance and visibility to the EaP: Integrated border management (IBM); Prevention of, preparedness for, and response to natural and man-made disasters; Environmental governance, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs); Diversification of energy supply; Regional electricity markets, energy efficiency and renewable energy.

Civil Society Forum (CSF)

The Multilateral dimension also established a Civil Society Forum of the Eastern Partnership to “promote contacts among civil society organizations and facilitate their dialogue with public authorities”. The first meeting of the Civil Society Forum was held in Brussels on 16-17 November 2009, and the second forum will be held in Berlin on 18-19 November 2010. The Forum established four working groups to match the four thematic platforms, and these working groups made recommendations regarding the future development of the EaP. However, further coordination is needed between the governmental and non-governmental platforms of EaP’s multilateral dimension, as they currently seem to be running in parallel.

It is not yet clear if the Civil Society Forum will be able to be more than a once in a year event. The initiative lacks adequate funding, as there is no money allocated to support civil society projects in 2010 and 2011. Even administrative costs related to the organization of the Forum do not seem to be covered easily.

Euronest

Euronest is the parliamentary component of the Eastern Partnership consisting of 60 members of the European Parliament and 60 MPs from the six EaP countries. The
Euronest regulations have been drawn, but Euronest is currently blocked, because the EU does not recognize the Belarusian parliament as a legitimate representative body. The EP proposed that the places of current Belarusian MPs in Euronest should be taken by representatives of the Belarusian opposition and civil society, but this is categorically rejected by the Belarusian government and is also not supported by the other EaP countries. The supporters of Belarus want the country to have equal rights in the EaP framework, and argue that the Belarusian civil society is already represented in the Civil Society Forum. In the given situation, it is up to the EU as a whole to decide if it wants to engage the Belarusian regime in the EaP or not. One possible solution to escape from the current situation would be to freeze the seats of Belarus in Euronest until the next parliamentary elections in that country.

**The EaP now. Comparison of EaP countries**

The period since the launch of the EaP saw no great improvements in the region. The economies of the EaP countries were seriously affected by the global economic crisis, with some of them (Ukraine, Armenia) experiencing double-digit GDP contractions in 2009. Also, on the democracy front, we have not experienced big improvements, with Moldova probably being the only exception. There were also no major improvements in the situation of the frozen conflicts. Even though High Representative Ashton declared that the neighbourhood is one of her priorities, EU’s current policies have not yielded great results in the region, and the EU is still far from having the role it wants in the Neighbourhood.

A recent University of Aberystwyth survey[2] on public opinions in Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, shows that Moldova is the most EU-friendly Eastern country. In Belarus every second responded was unable to name the location of the EU headquarters. EU’s policy instruments in the area are little known, the study revealed. In Belarus, 83% have never heard of the Neighbourhood Policy or the Eastern Partnership while in Ukraine the percentage is 80%. Less than half of Ukrainian respondents had positive emotions regarding the EU.

With regard to the economic integration of the EaP countries with the EU, it is clear that DCFTA’s are very remote in the case of some particular members. Two feasibility studies ordered by the European Commission for Armenia[3] and Georgia[4] showed that DCFTAs could bring important economic benefits to both countries but that “neither of the two countries is yet able to negotiate such far-reaching trade liberalization and even less to implement and sustain the commitments that it would require”[5]. Azerbaijan and Belarus are further behind, as neither of them is a member of the WTO. Belarus actually plans to join a customs union with Russia and Kazakhstan and thus to preclude free trade with the EU.

EU member states have diverging interests regarding the Neighbourhood and enlargement policies. Likewise, the six EaP countries have different views regarding their level of cooperation with the EU.
Armenia

Even though the EU is quite popular among Armenians, the Armenian political elite are rather divided with regard to the issue of European integration. The EaP is viewed positively, as the country has moderate ambitions regarding the development of its relations with the EU. Armenia's location between Azerbaijan and Turkey makes it a staunch Russian ally in the region, but also quite an isolated country. Consequently, the Eastern Partnership is seen as a way of escaping from regional isolation, but also as a way of obtaining new funds for the modernization of the country. In that sense Armenia has received from the EC macro-financial assistance worth 100 million Euros (65 million as a loan and 35 as a grant).

The Armenian government declared its interest in the liberalization of the visa regime and the creation of a free trade area with the EU. Armenia also hopes the EU could play a role in the stabilization of the troubled Caucasus region. The European Commission and Armenia plan to start negotiations on an Association Agreement that is supposed to replace the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The European Union is especially interested in the improvement of human rights and the quality of the elections in the country.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan, one of the most authoritarian EaP countries, is not interested in EU integration in practice, and while it wants to improve its ties with the EU, it has also made it clear that it will not participate in the multilateral track of the EaP with Armenia, as long as this country is occupying Azerbaijani territory. Azerbaijan also tends to see the Eastern Partnership as a repackaging of the existing programs and not as a completely new initiative.

Azerbaijan is especially interested in security issues, because of the ongoing conflict with Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh, but also in economic matters (especially related to energy) and the liberalization of the visa regime. However, the EU is less involved in the resolution of this conflict than in the ones in Georgia and Moldova. Because Azerbaijan is rich in energy resources, it is also less dependent on EU conditionality and less interested in EU’s economic assistance.

Azerbaijan does not seem willing to enact democratizing reforms. The Eastern Partnership was generally welcomed by the Azerbaijani civil society as a way of Europeanizing the regime. Despite these shortfalls, Azerbaijan remains a key energy resource partner for the EU, with the two sides planning to start negotiating an Association Agreement in July 2010.
Georgia

Since the 2003 Rose revolution, the president Saakashvili’s regime has called for the integration of the country in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. However, Georgia’s accession to NATO was seriously affected by the 2008 war with Russia and seems to be currently put off. As a result of the war, the country lost control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and consequently it looks for support from the EU to restore the territorial integrity of the state.

Georgia is interested in the involvement of the EU in conflict resolution in the Caucasus, but also in visa liberalization and the establishment of a free trade area with the EU. The country is also hoping for financial assistance from the EU including for the reconstruction of the areas affected by the recent war. As Georgia is an important energy transit country, the government is also interested in energy security and the development of new transit routes such as the EU backed Nabucco pipeline.

However, the war with Russia, president Saakashvili’s impulsive style, the clampdown on opposition media and the disproportionate use of force by the police during 2007 street protests, have seriously damaged Georgia’s reputation and have reduced the support it was enjoying in several European capital cities. Similar to the other two Caucasian countries, Georgia intends to start negotiating an Association Agreement with the EU.

Belarus

Just like for Armenia, Belarus saw the Eastern Partnership as a way of escaping from isolation, especially since its relations with Russia became increasingly bumpy in the last years, and was negatively affected by the 2008 Russia – Georgia war[6]. For the EU, inviting Belarus to the Eastern Partnership as a full-fledged member posed a moral dilemma as president Lukashenko is a well known human rights offender. However, as the regime had made some liberalization attempts and the previous policy of isolating Belarus hadn’t brought significant results, the EU went along and engaged the regime in Minsk.

The offer extended to Belarus to participate in the EaP was criticized by various Belarusian opposition parties for legitimizing the regime of president Lukashenko. The Belarusian civil society was more enthusiastic about the proposal, and seems to be quite active in the EaP Civil Society Forum. Belarus’ accession to the Eastern Partnership raised expectations in European capital cities, but these were quite rapidly moderated as it became clear that the regime in Minsk was interested in the economic benefits of the Eastern Partnership and expected the EU to refrain from any efforts to democratize the country.

Some of the EU institutions, such as the European Parliament, adopted a tougher stance on the issue of conditionality, and this is reflected in the problems faced by Euronest. Belarus has no plans to become a member of the EU, and the country has
the most authoritarian regime among the six EaP states. The population is also almost equally divided between those that prefer the European option and those that want closer integration with Russia.

**Ukraine**

Ukraine is by far the largest of the six EaP countries, having a population bigger than that of all the other five countries combined. Ukraine wants to integrate into the EU, and this has remained a strategic goal even after the change of political powers in Kiev, even though the new Ukrainian leadership has a more nuanced view regarding its foreign policy options.

Back in 2004 Ukraine was rather sceptical regarding the ENP because the policy treated European countries such as Ukraine on the same basis as countries from North Africa. From that respect the Eastern Partnership was viewed positively, because it differentiates between the European neighbours of the EU and the other ENP countries. However, it is clear that the Ukrainian political elite was unhappy about their country being put into the same basket with countries such as Azerbaijan, Belarus or Armenia, that are on a different level of relations with the EU. Doubts about the added value of the new instrument for Ukraine were also expressed. There was also disappointment about the reduced level of financing.

Ukraine was seen as the regional leader in terms of its relations with the EU. It was the first EaP country to start negotiating an Association Agreement with the EU, and is expected to conclude these negotiations in 2011. However, AA negotiations with the EU have not advanced at the expected rhythm, and even though Ukraine started negotiating a DCFTA in 2008, strong economic interest groups within Ukraine oppose having such an agreement with the EU.

**The case of Moldova**

The Communist government of Moldova confirmed its participation in the Eastern Partnership in 2008, but showed reduced enthusiasm in the initiative, asking instead for a European perspective. Several months later, former president Voronin declared in an interview with the Russian daily Kommersant[7] that the EaP “reminds him of a CIS 2”, “under the control of the EU”, that is forming a “ring around Russia”. Voronin dismissed the financial assistance offered in this framework as mere “candy given out on such occasions”. He also expressed dissatisfaction that Moldova was lumped together with states such as Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan that are behind Moldova in what concerns European integration. The foreign minister Andrei Stratan also expressed some doubts about this issue, declaring[8] that Moldova is confused about the Eastern Partnership, as it does not understand very clearly if its way towards European integration passes through the Western Balkans or the Ararat Mountain.
However the new governing coalition formed after the July 2009 elections, the Alliance for European Integration, adopted a more forthcoming position towards the EaP, cooperating fully with the EU. In January 2010 Moldova started the negotiations with the EU on the Association Agreement, and in April it received several European high level policy advisors that will promote reforms from inside the ministries. Moldova’s negotiations with the EU are moving faster than Ukraine’s, a situation helped by the much smaller size of the country and an increased willingness to accept EU conditions.

**Visa liberalization**

Unlike Ukraine and Russia, which expected concrete promises before engaging in the technical reforms demanded for lifting off the visas, Moldovan government adopted a pro-active position. The visa liberalization is one of the priorities of the current Moldovan government that started implementing reforms before being asked to do so by the EU. The visa dialogue was officially launched on June 15, and two EU evaluation missions are expected in September to study Moldova’s readiness regarding document security, biometric passports and illegal migration. Some of the most important problems regarding this issue are posed by the situation of Transnistria.

As a result of these two evaluation missions, the Moldovan government expects to receive from the EU a clear road-map for visa liberalization this fall, but the EU will probably not offer a road map until after the November 2010 elections. Moldova could probably obtain a visa free regime with the EU in about 3 years.

**Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)**

Trade relations with Moldova were not a priority for the EU in the 1990s, as the country was a very minor trade partner for the Union, accounting for less than 0.1% of EU’s total trade. EU’s trade framework with Moldova improved as trade grew and the Union enlarged eastwards. The EU offered Moldova several unilateral trade preferences, a generalized system of preferences (GSP) up to January 2006 and an extended system (GSP+) after that date. This allowed for duty free export for about 22% of Moldova’s agricultural products and 55% of its non-agricultural products. In March 2008 the EU unilaterally granted Moldova an Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP), a system that allows duty free access to the EU market for all Moldovan products with the exception of a number of agricultural products for whom certain quotas as still retained. Some of these restrictions affect products that are very important for the Moldovan economy, such as wine.

Now Moldova has the most EU oriented economy in the EaP group. In 2009 Moldovan exports to the EU were 678.5 million dollars and represented more than 50% of all of Moldova’s exports. In May-June 2010 a Commission Delegation was in
Moldova to evaluate the country's institutional and legislative capacity to negotiate and implement a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement with the EU. The delegation is expected to publish a report with recommendation for each area. Negotiations regarding the creation of a DCFTA will probably begin this fall. While the Moldovan government expects to be able to sign an agreement 2 years after the launch of negotiations, these will most probably take longer. While the country will benefit as a result of the DCFTA it should also be mentioned that the implementation costs will be high. An estimation[9] of these costs puts the figure for Moldova at 1.1 bn dollars, about 20% of its 2009 GDP.

Transnistria

Even though the conflict in Transnistria is the least violent of the four “frozen conflicts” in the EaP area, on the long term, Transnistria will remain one of the most important obstacles for Moldova’s European ambitions. The last few months have seen an intensification of the dialogue regarding the conflict, with several high level declarations (Medvedev-Yanukovych, Medvedev-Merkel) that raised hopes regarding a possible resolution of the conflict. Moldova hopes that, by rapidly improving its European integration perspectives, it will also become more attractive for the population on the left bank of the Dniester.

Conclusions and recommendations

It is clear that the Eastern Partnership initiative was generally well received in the region, as it made a much expected differentiation between the Eastern and Southern dimensions of the ENP.

As shown above, notwithstanding their common recent history, the EaP countries vary greatly, both in their characteristics and in their expectations vis-à-vis the EU. As it was suggested by other authors[10], more attention should be given to the individual characteristics of each country, as the six EaP countries don’t represent a coherent group and it would also be difficult to divide them into two coherent 3-country groups. Moldova and Ukraine form a separate group within the EaP, being the countries mostly advanced in their European integration. While Ukraine was the leader for a long time, Moldova is rapidly catching up, being the only country that rapidly developed its relations with the EU during the last year. As shown in the paper, the EaP region has not experienced major improvements in the last year. Moldova turned out to be a positive surprise, and if the rhythm of reforms is maintained, the country could be the visible success needed by the Eastern Partnership.

But the programme itself will also need some tweaking. Funding is one of its major weaknesses. It is clear that the EaP funding is inadequate for what the programme intends to achieve. The EU should also make it clearer how it plans to coordinate in
the EaP countries with other EU initiatives such as the Black Sea Synergy, with international or regional organizations and agencies and the bilateral programmes of individual member states in order not to duplicate efforts.

The EU should be ready to intervene and help EaP countries to cope with economic and political crises. Moldova represents just 0.1% of EU’s trade, and thus the impact on the EU markets of a more liberalized trade regime with it is reduced, while for its economy this is an important issue. The EU should be more willing to open its agricultural market, especially for small countries such as Moldova.

The EU is interested in the security and prosperity of its immediate neighbourhood, but it is clear that some of the expectations of the EaP countries regarding security are not met by the EaP. The EU is partially involved in conflict resolution in the region, but often the EU only reacts to events, without having a clear strategy or political determination. Notwithstanding this reduced involvement in solving the region’s (frozen) conflicts, the EU ended up paying the reconstruction bill in cases such as Georgia. What is needed is a strengthened foreign and security dimension for the EaP and a conflict resolution strategy for the region, especially since NATO membership cannot be presumed.

Some of the countries in the region are vulnerable to economic pressure, because they are dependent on the markets or the energy resources of some bigger players. The EU needs to develop concrete steps to be taken in order to strengthen energy security and reduce the dependency on a single supplier. In this sense some of the thematic platforms and flagship initiatives in these topics could prove to be very important.

The EU has not given significant support to civil society organizations from the Eastern Partnership countries. Even the current financial allocations are largely oriented towards national governments. The EU should invest more in building capacity in the civil society organizations (CSO) in the EaP countries, and also properly involve CSOs in the development of the programme.

Regarding Moldova, its government should realize that, notwithstanding its desire to receive a clear membership perspective, the Eastern Partnership is the best framework on offer for the time being, and thus it should use it to its full potential. That said, Moldova should continue to strive to obtain a membership perspective on the long term, and not just the perspective to be integrated in a Neighbourhood Economic Community, a possible end goal of the Eastern Partnership.

Even though it is largely acknowledged by the government, there are still some voices in the Moldovan establishment that look for shortcuts in integrating into the EU. Moldova’s political leaders should not count on getting an early accession perspective based on geopolitical reasons, but they should strive to implement all the reforms needed.

New structures matter if they get to outlive the moment in which they were created. In that sense, the Group of Friends of the Eastern Partnership still needs to
prove its practical utility in drawing support for the EaP and pushing forward the programme. Moldova should try to find active supporters of the programme from all EU regions, not just from the east.

Because the EU continues to plan policies in terms of geographical blocs, in time, Moldova should try to escape an Eastern Partnership bloc. If countries such as Azerbaijan or Belarus do not democratize, being associated with them might damage Moldova's European prospects. Even though it is the bilateral track of the EaP that is more important, associations matter, both for public opinion and policymakers.

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6. Belarus hasn't recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia.


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His most important books are:


Collmer, Sabine

Dr. Sabine Collmer is a Professor of International Security Studies at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. Before assuming this position, she was Director of Research and Senior Researcher at the College of International Security Studies / GCMC. Her professional background covers research at the Institute for Social Research of the Bundeswer (SOWI) (1991-1995), interdisciplinary science management at Technical University Berlin (1995-1998) and fulltime lecturer at the University of the German Armed Forces in Munich (1999-2005). In 2000 she was elected vice-president of the Working Group on Armed Forces and Social Sciences (AMS) in Germany.

Gerasymchuk, Sergiy

Mgr. Sergiy Gerasymchuk works as International Programs Director at Strategic and Security Studies Group – Kyiv based think-tank focused on researching regional security issues and international relations. Mgr. Gerasymchuk graduated from Kyiv-Mohyla Academy with the Master’s degree in political science. He is alumnus of European Security Academies in Gumpoldskirchen (Austria) in 2005, 2006, 2007 and a member of the Scientific-advisory council under the Parliamentary Committee for European Integration (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine).
**Grosu, Vitalie**

Mr. Vitalie Grosu is the Executive Director of the Information and Documentation Centre on NATO in Republic of Moldova. Before 2010 he was the lecturer at the Moldova State University, International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences Department. His research background covers fields of international security, democratic transition, European and regional integration. During the years he was expert in different research projects. He holds a Master degree in International Relations, European Studies at the International Relations Institute “Perspectiva” and currently he is PhD student at the Moldovan Academy of Science, Speciality: Political Institutions and Processes.

**Harbo, Florentina**

Dr. Florentina HARBO is special adviser at the Norwegian Centre for Strategic Studies in Oslo. She has a PhD in political sciences, legal bases of politics from the Otto-Suhr Institute of Political Sciences of the Free University of Berlin (2004) and a post–doc on secession right from the same Institute (2005). She has previously got a Master degree from the European Institute of Advanced International Studies from Nice, France (2000). In 2005 her book *Towards a European Federation? The EU in the Light of Comparative Federalism* has been published at Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden. Her current research interests are: Russian geopolitics, Svalbard, Northern and Arctic geopolitics, the law of the sea, etc.


**Kass, Kaarel**

Kaarel Kaas works as a researcher for the International Centre for Defence Studies (ICDS, www.icds.ee ) based in Tallinn, Estonia. At ICDS he deals mainly with Russian military developments and with security situation in the so-called „post-Soviet space“ . Kaas also co-edits the Centre’s monthly foreign policy magazine, Diplomaatia.
From 1998-2003, Kaarel worked as a reporter at Estonia’s leading daily newspaper, Postimees, covering mainly politics and defence and security related issues. From 2003-2006 he was Postimees's foreign news editor, in which position he also filed reports from various global hot spots.

Since joining ICDS he has continued to publish columns on defence and security policy in the Estonian media.

Nantoi, Oazu

Member of the Moldovan Parliament, Commission on National Security, Defense and Public Order. During 2000 -2010 - Program Director of Regional Conflicts, Institute of Public Policy Moldova (www.ipp.md). Author of several studies on the issue of regional conflicts and security.

Niculescu, George

George Niculescu at the time of the seminar, was staff officer at the NATO International Staff (IS)/ Defence Policy and Planning Division. Prior to that, he was staff officer at Political Affairs and Security Policy Division of NATO IS (2004-2007), and held various positions with a focus on defence policy and international cooperation, including as deputy director and advisor to the deputy minister of defence, in the Ministry of National Defence of Romania (1994-2004). In 1994, he graduated the Faculty of European Integration and International Relations at the National School for Political Studies and Public Administration of Bucharest, and in 1988 he graduated the Faculty of Mechanics at the Polytechnic Institute of Bucharest. In 2001, he was a member of the Royal College of Defence Studies in London, and in 1995 he completed a 4.5 months course at the College for Strategic Studies and Defence Economics at the George Marshall Centre in Garmisch-Partenkirchen (Germany).

Ivan, Paul

Paul Ivan is a Researcher at the Romanian Center for European Policies (CRPE) where he works on EU external relations and security issues. Paul holds an MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and BAs in International Relations, European Studies and History.
Sabev, Sabi


The professional carrier of Maj. Gen. Sabev passed through various duties on tactical, operational and strategic levels, from air squadron chief of staff, through air regiment and AD division chief of staff, chief of operations of air corps and Air Force, head of Operations and Strategic planning directorates in the General Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and up to Military Representative of Bulgaria to NATO HQ in Brussels, in the period 2002 – 2004.

During his military career Maj. Gen Sabev has been heavily involved in the elaboration of strategic reviews, analysis and plans, strategic and doctrinal guiding documents, planning and participation of Bulgarian military contingents in NATO PfP exercises and peacekeeping operations. He has headed a working group which worked out the first Bulgarian Force Structure Review and Force Modernization Plan. As a first National Military Representative to NATO HQ, he has build up and integrated the Bulgarian military representation into NATO Military Committee activities.

Since 2006 Maj. Gen. Sabev is working as a senior expert in the Defence Advanced Research Institute to the Rakovski Defence Academy on research issues related to the allied and national security and defence, military strategy, defence planning and development of force capabilities and defence and force transformation. He is also a lecturer in New Bulgarian University, Sofia, on NATO and ESDP civilian and military structures and their working mechanisms.

Currently Maj. Gen. Sabev is a director of international relation of the NATO Defense College Anciens’ Association in Bulgaria, member of the Steering committee of the Association of the officers of the reserve “Atlantic” and director of the foundation “Center of National Security Studies”.

Sully, Melanie

Melanie Sully is Vice President of the Institute for Parliamentarism and Democracy Questions in Vienna. She was a professor in political science at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna from 1992-2009 and before that guest professor at the University of Innsbruck for three years. Dr Sully has published widely on European politics especially Britain, Austria and the Black Sea Region. Latest publications include "The Odessa Connection" and "Black Sea Calling". As Vice President of the Institute Dr Sully is responsible for international relations and project management. The institute is based in the Austrian parliament (in the offices of the parliamentary group of the ÖVP but functions independently).
**Volovoj, Vadim**

Vadim Volovoj is a PhD student in Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations and Political Science (Lithuania), where he got Bachelor and Master degree in political science. At the same time he occupies the position of senior expert in Center for Geopolitical Studies (www.geopolitika.lt). His main academic interests are – foreign and internal policy of Russian Federation, the United States, Central Asia and Lithuania, also strategic and military studies.

**Vreja, Lucia Ovidia**

Dr. Vreja Lucia Ovidia is the President of the Association for Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Security – ADDRESS in Bucharest, Romania. Her professional background covers research at the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History (1999-2006) and analytical work for the Ministry of National Defence (2006-2009). She holds a Doctorate Degree in Economics from the Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest.